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Earlier studies conducted in South Africa suggest that negative attitudes towards immigrants 
are widespread and driven by resource strain, issues around national identity, and the process 
of ‘othering’. This study uses data from the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study, with a 
representative sample of young adults (n=2915), in order to explore attitudes towards 
immigrants in Cape Town. Using a series of vignettes, that is, descriptions of situations in 
which the details are varied systematically, the researcher examines the extent to which the 
nationality and individual circumstances of immigrants affect support for deportation or the 
legitimacy of illegal direct action against them. The results indicate that although attitudes 
towards immigrants are generally negative, among young Adults in Cape Town, they are not 
monolithic. To some extent, immigrants’ characteristics and circumstances affect attitudes 
towards them. This differentiation suggests some aspects of causality, but only indirectly. 
The discussion of the results illuminates the importance of considering other factors that 
affect attitudes towards immigrants, such as a respondent’s labour market position and 
income, educational background and individual demographic characteristics. Evidence 
suggests that negative attitudes are not associated closely with any social or economic 
characteristics or the respondent, that is, negative attitudes are not especially pronounced in 
any particular economic, demographic or social group. This is somehow linked to the fact 
that manipulating the characteristics of the subject in the vignette has effects on respondents’ 
attitudes. Evidence from a complementary qualitative study, using semi-structured interview 
techniques in five neighbourhoods in Cape Town (n=13), supported the argument that 
attitudes towards immigrants are generally negative, and are affected by the social milieu in 
which people are situated. The researcher concludes that further research, on the effect of 
manipulating the racial background and economic status of immigrants, could benefit from a 
more holistic ethnographic approach, which enables an expanded and more nuanced 













AIDS  Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
CAPS  Cape Area Panel Study 
CSSR  Centre for Social Science Research 
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HIV  Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
HRW  Human Rights Watch 
PSU  Primary Sampling Unit 
R  Rand 
SAHRC South African Human Rights Commission 
SAMP  Southern African Migration Project 
SAPS  South African Police Services 
SASAS South African Social Attitude Surveys  
SSU  Social Survey Unit 












TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION .................................................................................................................................................. I 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................................ II 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................................................... III 
ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................................................. IV 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................................... V 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................................................... VII 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................................ VII 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 THE USE OF VIGNETTES IN THE STUDY OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS ........................................... 3 
1.2 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY .............................................................................................................. 3 
1.2.1 Objective of the Study ........................................................................................................................... 4 
1.2.2 Aims of the Study .................................................................................................................................. 4 
1.2.3 Defining the Research Questions ......................................................................................................... 4 
1.3 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS ................................................................................................................................. 4 
CHAPTER 2: ATTITUDE FORMATION IN CONTEXT – A LITERATURE REVIEW ........................... 6 
2.1 ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA.................................................... 6 
2.1.1 The Content and Causes of Attitudes towards Immigrants in South Africa ......................................... 6 
2.1.2 The Scope of Negative Attitudes in South Africa .................................................................................. 8 
2.1.3 A Brief Overview of the Comparative Literature ................................................................................. 9 
2.2 FORMULATING HYPOTHESES ...................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.1 Cultural Factors Affecting Attitudes towards Immigrants ................................................................. 12 
2.2.2 Economic and Social Factors Affecting Attitudes towards Immigrants ............................................. 15 
2.3 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................. 24 
CHAPTER 3: DEPORTATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS ..................................... 25 
3.1 EXPLORING ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS THROUGH SUPPORT FOR DEPORTATION .......................... 26 
3.1.1 Overall Distribution of Responses ..................................................................................................... 29 
3.1.2 Effect of the Manipulations by Vignette Version ................................................................................ 29 
3.1.3 The Effect of the Manipulations by Immigrant Characteristics and Circumstances .......................... 31 
3.2 SUMMARY STATISTICS AND BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS ............................................................................ 32 
3.3 MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS ....................................................................................................... 34 
3.3.1 Support for Deportation of an Undocumented Zimbabwean Immigrant ............................................ 35 
3.3.2 Support for Deportation of an Immigrant Family .............................................................................. 37 












CHAPTER 4: LOOTING AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS ............................................... 40 
4.1 EXPLORING ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS THROUGH THE MORALITY OF LOOTING ............................ 40 
4.1.1 Manipulations and Hypotheses .......................................................................................................... 42 
4.2 JUDGEMENTS ON COLLECTIVE LOOTING ..................................................................................................... 43 
4.2.1 The Effect of the Manipulations ......................................................................................................... 43 
4.3 SUMMARY STATISTICS AND BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS ............................................................................ 44 
4.4 MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................... 46 
4.5 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................................ 50 
CHAPTER 5 PERCEPRTIONS ABOUT IMMIGRANTS IN FIVE NEIGHBOURHOODS IN CAPE 
TOWN ................................................................................................................................................................. 51 
5.1 FACTORS THAT AFFECT PEOPLE’S ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS ..................................................... 51 
5.1.1 Sindiswa ............................................................................................................................................. 52 
5.1.2 Dylan .................................................................................................................................................. 53 
5.1.3 Ryan ................................................................................................................................................... 54 
5.1.4 Dumisa ............................................................................................................................................... 55 
5.1.5 Dineo .................................................................................................................................................. 56 
5.2 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................................ 57 
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 62 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................... 67 
APPENDICES ..................................................................................................................................................... 77 
APPENDIX 1: STUDY METHODS ......................................................................................................................... 77 
APPENDIX 2: CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT (CAPS 2009) ................................................................................. 85 
APPENDIX 3: CONCERNING HOUSING, SANITATION AND WATER (CAPS 2009) ............................................... 88 
APPENDIX 4: CONCERNING CRIME AND VIOLENCE (CAPS 2009)..................................................................... 89 
APPENDIX 5: CONCERNING UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS (CAPS 2009) ....................................................... 91 
APPENDIX 6: SUMMARY STATISTICS (UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT) .............................................................. 92 
APPENDIX 7: SUMMARY STATISTICS (IMMIGRANT FAMILY) ............................................................................. 93 
APPENDIX 8: BIVARIATE REGRESSIONS (UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT) ......................................................... 94 
APPENDIX 9: BIVARIATE REGRESSIONS (IMMIGRANT FAMILY) ........................................................................ 95 
APPENDIX 10: SEQUENTIAL MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODELS (UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT) ............... 96 
APPENDIX 11: SEQUENTIAL MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODELS (IMMIGRANT FAMILY) ............................. 97 
APPENDIX 12: SUMMARY STATISTICS (TRADER) .............................................................................................. 98 
APPENDIX 13: BIVARIATE REGRESSIONS (TRADER) ......................................................................................... 99 













LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF DAYS A HOUSEHOLD DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH TO EAT ........................................................ 86 
FIGURE 2: EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY GENDER AND POPULATION GROUP ............................................................... 86 
FIGURE 3: ACCEPTANCE OF A LOW-STATUS JOB BY GENDER AND POPULATION GROUP ......................................... 87 
FIGURE 4: MEAN STIGMA BY GENDER AND POPULATION GROUP............................................................................ 91 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 1: VIGNETTE VERSIONS ON THE UNDOCUMENTED ZIMBABWEAN IMMIGRANT .......................................... 27 
TABLE 2: VIGNETTE VERSIONS ON THE IMMIGRANT FAMILY ................................................................................ 28 
TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES ON THE SUPPORT FOR DEPORTATION ...................................................... 29 
TABLE 4: GROSS EFFECTS OF MANIPULATING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF AN UNDOCUMENTED ZIMBABWEAN 
IMMIGRANT BY VIGNETTE VERSION ............................................................................................................ 30 
TABLE 5: EFFECTS OF MANIPULATING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AN IMMIGRANT FAMILY BY VIGNETTE VERSION
 .................................................................................................................................................................... 31 
TABLE 6: THE EFFECTS OF MANIPULATING AN IMMIGRANT’S CHARACTERISTICS AND CIRCUMSTANCES ............. 32 
TABLE 7: LOOTING VIGNETTE VERSIONS ............................................................................................................... 42 
TABLE 8: BASIC JUDGMENTS ON LOOTING ............................................................................................................. 43 
TABLE 9: GROSS EFFECTS OF MANIPULATING THE IMMIGRANT’S NATIONALITY AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR 
LOOTING ...................................................................................................................................................... 44 
TABLE 10: CAPS 2000 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS .............................................................................................. 80 
TABLE 11: NEIGHBOURHOOD STUDY SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS ........................................................................ 82 
TABLE 12: HOUSING DISTRIBUTION ...................................................................................................................... 88 
TABLE 13: VIEWS ABOUT VIOLENCE BY POPULATION GROUP ................................................................................ 89 
TABLE 14: AWARENESS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE BY POPULATION GROUP ........................................................... 90 
TABLE 15: EXPERIENCES OF CRIME BY POPULATION GROUP .................................................................................. 90 














CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of democratic government in South Africa, in 1994, a number of studies 
(McDonald, 1998; Morris, 1998; Dobson and Oelofse, 2000; Reitzes and Bam, 2000; Landau 
et al., 2005; Crush et al., 2008; Everatt, 2010; Misago et al., 2010) have found evidence of 
hostility towards African immigrants. The findings from these studies suggest that attitudes 
towards immigrants from other African countries are generally negative. 
 
South African media reports explain the causal factors of the negative attitudes in relation to 
apartheid – the country’s divisive and exclusionary past
1
 – competition for limited economic 
resources
2
, poor service delivery
3
, and poor migration policies and strategies that fail to 
control the country’s borders
4
. Some researchers (Neocosmos, 2008; Misago, 2009; Misago 
et al., 2010) have argued that the negative attitudes towards immigrants derive from the 
micro-politics of the country’s townships, compounded by the lack of institutional structures, 
state patronage, and leadership. Qualitative studies of the attitudes towards immigrants tend 
to be case studies of neighbourhoods with high levels of economic deprivation, most notably 
urban black informal settlements
5
 and townships. Factors that relate to the formation of 
attitudes towards immigrants, coming out of these studies, focus on a culture of violence – as 
a means of solving social problems – that prevails in most urban black informal settlements 
and townships. 
 
                                                 
1
 “All of South Africa is guilty” City Press 17 May 2008  
2




 “Pushed to the limit” The Witness 23 May 2008 
5
 An informal settlement, also known as a squatter neighbourhood, is an unplanned, high-density residential 












The violence so prevalent in South Africa can be traced back to the apartheid government’s 
repression and legislated inequalities of resources and opportunities, as a result social 
services – education, employment, housing and infrastructure development – are highly 
politicised (Hamber, 1998). In post-apartheid South Africa, rapid urbanisation, which is 
partly a result of rural to urban migration, has exacerbated social problems – such as crime 
and poverty – in the cities. The mushrooming of large urban informal settlements makes 
policing of illegal activities in these sprawling unplanned settlements very difficult, and, as a 
result, crime and violence are rife there. 
 
Although South Africa is a middle-income country, the majority of black South Africans are 
poor. Inequality and poverty along racial lines became entrenched during the apartheid era of 
separate development. Sixteen years after the advent of democracy, black South Africans are 
still experiencing the effects of a long history of the unequal distribution of economic and 
social resources. Poverty and social inequality are endemic, in black neighbourhoods, and 
some researchers (Dobson and Oelofse, 2000, Everatt, 2010) argue that immigrants present 
more economic threat to black South Africans. Attitude surveys conducted in South Africa 
appear to counter these findings as the basis for negative attitudes towards immigrants. The 
findings of these surveys suggest that attitudes towards immigrants are similar across class, 
income levels and race (Mattes et al., 1999; Crush et al., 2008). Generally, South Africans 
exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants – particularly immigrants from other African 
countries (McDonald et al., 2000) – and they exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards 













1.1 The Use of Vignettes in the Study of Attitudes towards Immigrants 
Although numerous studies explore attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa, a search of 
the literature found no evidence that any of these studies made use of ‘vignettes’ as a research 
technique. Vignettes are a useful technique for the study of attitudes where responses are 
vulnerable to being tainted by anticipation of what is socially desirable or where context – 
economic, cultural, political or social – matters. According to Alexander and Becker 
(1978:94), vignettes are “short descriptions of a person or a social situation which contain 
precise references to what are thought to be the most important factors in the decision-making 
processes of respondents”. 
 
For many years, researchers have argued that abstract questions – typical of opinion surveys 
– are subject to unreliable and biased self-reports (Nosanchuk, 1972; Alexander and Becker, 
1978; Finch, 1987). Researchers espouse the use of vignettes – for the study of attitudes – as 
a means of producing more valid and more reliable measures of respondents’ opinions. For 
this reason, vignettes have been used in studies of kin relationships (Finch, 1989), racism 
(Sniderman and Piazza, 1993), civil liberties (Gibson and Gouws, 2003), and attitudes 
towards immigrants (Harell, Soroka and Andrew, 2011), to mention but a few. 
 
In this study, the researcher uses vignettes as an alternative method of exploring attitudes 
towards immigrants. By varying the characteristics used in the descriptions, the vignettes 
make it possible for the researcher to analyse the effects on people’s judgements. 
1.2 A Brief Overview of the Study 
There is an emerging trend of using both qualitative and quantitative data in social research. 
Surveys have weaknesses as well as strengths, by mixing qualitative with quantitative 
methods; a researcher can address some of the weaknesses of survey research. Therefore, this 
study has adopted a two-pronged approach in order to explore the extent and nature of 
attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town. This study makes use of data collected through 
the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study (henceforth CAPS 2009). This wave contained a 
new module, which used vignettes to probe attitudes toward immigrants. Complementary 
data from individual interviews, which formed part of a neighbourhood study in newly built 
low-income formal housing projects – in Delft Leiden, Delft North, Delft South, Tambo 












1.2.1 Objective of the Study 
The main objective of the study is to explore the extent and nature of attitudes towards 
immigrants in Cape Town. The researcher builds on the foundation laid by existing studies, 
but uses vignettes as a possible means of producing more valid and more reliable measures of 
the respondents’ attitudes towards immigrants. 
1.2.2 Aims of the Study 
The aims of this study are: 
a. To explore the extent and nature of attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town, 
b. To investigate the impact of manipulating an immigrant’s characteristics and 
circumstances – thought to influence attitude formation – on attitudes towards 
immigrants, and 
c. To describe the extent and nature of attitudes towards immigrants in a way that captures 
both the scale and the real experiences of South Africans living in Cape Town. 
1.2.3 Defining the Research Questions 
In order to contribute towards understanding attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town, this 
study answers the following questions: 
a. What is the extent and nature of attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town? 
b. What characteristics and circumstances of an individual immigrant affect support for 
deportation or looting among young adults in Cape Town? 
c. Which group of respondents, in Cape Town, exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards 
immigrants? 
1.3 Outline of Chapters  
The introductory chapter highlights the focus of the study. The following five chapters 
discuss the extent and nature of attitudes towards immigrants. The appendix also includes a 
description of the study site, an outline of the data used in the study, and a description of the 
method of data collection. 
 
Chapter two presents the review of the theoretical literature, which seeks to explain attitude 














In chapter three, the researcher uses vignettes to explore the respondents’ support for the 
deportation of immigrants from South Africa. This chapter describes two vignettes, 
comprising short stories about immigrants, which manipulate an immigrant’s characteristics 
and circumstances in order to explore the extent to which these affect the respondents’ 
support for the deportation of immigrants. 
 
Chapter four addresses the issue of looting, or the use of violence against immigrants who 
operate small businesses in townships. One vignette explores the moral codes that inform the 
respondents’ judgements, for or against, looting of the business of a specific national and of a 
trader whose nationality is unspecified. 
 
Chapter five introduces thirteen home-owners from the new public housing projects in five 
areas of Cape Town (Delft Leiden, Delft North, Delft South, Tambo Square and Weltevreden 
Valley). This chapter builds on the analysis provided in chapters three and four, but the focus 
shifts to analysing attitudes towards, and perceptions of, immigrants in an area that has 
undergone racial restructuring in post-apartheid Cape Town. 
 
The final chapter offers concluding remarks, and the implications the findings have on the 













CHAPTER 2: ATTITUDE FORMATION IN CONTEXT – A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter forms the literature review for this study. The discussion focuses on the theories, 
which offer explanations about the formation of attitudes towards immigrants in South 
Africa, and considers evidence from other countries. The theories illustrate the effect of the 
economic, political and social contexts on public opinion towards immigrants. 
2.1 Attitudes towards Immigrants in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, incidents of anti-immigrant protests in 
predominantly black urban townships and informal settlements, in the media, have prompted 
researchers to examine the factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants. Local evidence of 
a variety of attitudes towards immigrants, at individual, community and national levels, are 
from qualitative and quantitative studies (Minnaar and Hough, 1996; McDonald et al., 1998; 
Dodson and Oelofse, 2000; McDonald et al., 2000; Landau et al., 2005; Landau, 2008; Pillay 
et al., 2008; Crush et al., 2010; Everatt, 2010; Misago et al., 2010). 
2.1.1 The Content and Causes of Attitudes towards Immigrants in South Africa 
A number of qualitative studies have focused on exploring attitudes towards immigrants in 
South Africa. Their findings have been broadly similar, focusing on resource strain, national 
identity and processes of ‘othering’. 
 
In 1998, Morris profiled the lives of twenty Congolese and Nigerian immigrants living in 
Johannesburg. The study investigated the problems, which faced the immigrants, and 
described and analysed their interactions with South Africans. Morris suggests that the 
increase in documented and undocumented immigration coming into South Africa in the 
years following the advent of democracy, taken in a context of scarce resources, has seen 













Dodson and Oelofse (2000) conducted a series of interviews with immigrants and South 
African nationals in Mizamoyethu, an informal settlement in Hout Bay, Cape Town. The 
findings from this study suggest that, while social and cultural differences are straining 
neighbourhood relations, attitudes towards immigrants and the related violence are a result of 
competition for scarce resources, such as employment and housing. 
 
Both Morris (1998) and Dodson and Oelofse (2000) found that competition for employment, 
housing and services is grounded in the national discourse on immigration, which fuels 
negative attitudes towards immigrants and the related violence – findings supported in other 
studies (Maharaj and Rajkurmar, 1997; McDonald, Mashike and Golden, 1999; Sinclair, 
1999). 
 
A study by Reitzes and Bam (2000) on Mozambican residents in Winterveld, found that 
negative attitudes towards immigrants, and the related violence, was even targeted against 
immigrants who had lived in South Africa for many years, and who were embedded in the 
local culture. The authors note a shift in attitudes towards immigrants after the advent of 
democracy. As a focal point of national identity, immigration issues are used to create a 
scapegoat for the ills of post-apartheid South Africa. In the absence of the racial ‘other’, 
immigrants are blamed for social, economic and political problems of the country. 
 
Sensationalist media and an overtly exclusionary political discourse reflect the growth of 
negative attitudes towards immigrants. Danso and McDonald (2001) reviewed the South 
African English press from 1994 onwards, and concluded that the media was largely anti-
immigrant, and non-critical in reporting on immigration issues. Published material was 
predominately sensationalist, reproducing statistics and assumptions, and negatively 
stereotyping immigrants – particularly those from other African countries. These stereotypes 
include framing immigrants as criminals, illegal and job takers. Several high-profile 
politicians and public figures have also added their voices to the negative discourse, as has 













While negative attitudes towards immigrants are evident from qualitative case studies of 
specific neighbourhoods (Dolan, 1995; Maharaj and Rajkumar, 1997; Morris, 1998; Sinclair, 
1999; Reitzes and Bam 2000; Dodson and Oelofse, 2000) quantitative studies show the extent 
of these negative attitudes. 
2.1.2 The Scope of Negative Attitudes in South Africa  
The growing evidence of negative attitudes towards immigrants and the limited scope of 
previous research prompted the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP henceforth) to 
commission a national survey of South Africans’ attitudes towards immigrants and 
immigration issues. The SAMP has conducted public opinion surveys on South African 
immigration attitudes; national surveys in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe; and surveys with immigrants in South Africa. The results of these studies are 
published in several reports (Reitzes and Crawhall, 1997; McDonald et al., 1998; Mattes et 
al., 1999; McDonald et al., 1999; Crush, 2000; Crush and Pendleton, 2004; Crush et al., 
2008). 
 
The SAMP survey series showed four key trends. Firstly, that negative attitudes towards 
immigrants are widespread (Crush et al., 2008). Although attitudes that favour restricting 
immigration do not automatically imply negative attitudes towards immigrants, in South 
Africa, nationalist attitudes go along with negative attitudes towards immigrants. Secondly, 
South Africans show greater hostility compared to other countries for which data are 
available (Crush and Pendleton, 2004). Thirdly, intolerance has risen since 1994, supporting 
the claims made in qualitative studies. Lastly, there is no profile for people who exhibit 
negative attitudes towards immigrants, as attitudes cut across age, gender, income level and 
race (Mattes et al., 1999; Crush, 2000; Crush et al., 2008). 
 
The SAMP surveys largely confirm the assessments and conclusions from local case studies 
with rigorous and nationally representative data. The surveys provide a description of 
negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration issues in South Africa. However, 
noticeably lacking in the literature on attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa, are the 
factors that underlie differences in attitudes at the local level, in particular, in relation to 
specific characteristics and circumstances of an individual immigrant. Even qualitative 
studies have taken a scientific and materialistic position, preferring to list causes, without 












2.1.3 A Brief Overview of the Comparative Literature 
Comparative research provides an array of findings related to attitude formation about 
immigrants. One point of convergence, however, is that immigrant sentiments across Western 
countries are generally negative. In both Europe and in the United States of America (USA 
henceforth), evidence suggests that the underlying predictors of individual attitudes towards 
immigrants are the same. The main explanatory factors of attitude formation relate to the 
economic or cultural threat that immigrants pose to nationals. 
 
Findings from much of the previous work on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration 
issues in Europe and the USA, is mainly quantitative and can be divided into two broad 
categories. A number of studies have found that race and ethnicity affect the formation of 
opinion about immigrants (Berg, 2009; Rocha et al., 2011). Another body of literature 
focuses on those factors that influence individual perceptions of the economic impact (both 
negative and positive) of immigrants (Hernes and Knudsen, 1992; Citrin et al., 1997; Hood 
and Morris, 1998). A review of the underpinnings of these two broad theoretical perspectives 
provides the context for a better understanding of the analysis in the following chapters. 
 
With regards to the economic threat, attitudes towards immigrants are the result of increased 
competition for scarce resources like jobs, government benefits and housing (Citrin et al., 
1997). The economic threat hypotheses have been investigated at both the macro and 
individual level. At the macro level, findings suggest that when an economy is performing 
poorly, people are expected to be more hostile towards immigrants because competition for 
scarce resources, like jobs, is greater (Palmer, 1996). This is compounded by the number of 
immigrants in a neighbourhood (Hood and Morris, 1998). Quillian (1995) tested this 
argument and found support for it in the European context. Other research has found similar 
relationships between the state of the economy, levels of immigration and negative attitudes 













Individual-level evidence is somewhat mixed. The expectation is that people who are in 
direct competition for jobs, government benefits and housing with immigrants will exhibit 
more negative attitudes towards immigrants. Citrin et al. (1997) found that those with less 
education are often generally more hostile towards immigrants. However, Wilkes et al. 
(2008) found that the impact of economic factors did not vary with economic status. People 
tended to prefer higher-skilled immigrants, regardless of their personal situation (Hainmueller 
and Hiscox, 2010) – a finding at odds with the direct competition hypothesis, since that 
would suggest that highly skilled individuals would be threatened by highly skilled 
immigrants. 
 
There is also a growing body of work suggesting that an individual’s personal economic 
situation is wholly unrelated to his or her attitude towards immigrants (e.g. Citrin and Slides, 
2008; Citrin et al., 1997). Thus, the economic threat argument has received substantial 
support at the macro level, but varied support at the individual level. Regarding the latter, one 
person’s position does not seem as important as the economic characteristics of the 
immigrants themselves. 
 
A second approach to understanding attitudes towards immigrants focuses on the cultural 
threats posed by immigrants. This approach focuses on cultural, ethnic and religious 
differences between nationals and immigrants. When differences are seen to be greater, so are 
negative attitudes towards immigrants. When immigrants are viewed as more culturally 
similar, they are more likely to be accepted by nationals. When it comes to immigration, 
immigrants are seen as culturally, ethnically and racially distinct, such that measures of 
ethnocentrism and racism are important predictors of attitudes towards immigrants 
(Pettigrew, 1998). Religion is another factor that influences popular perceptions of national 
identity (Citrin, Reingold and Green, 1990). Thus, when people think of immigrants as 
culturally or racially different – and when immigrants themselves espouse more ethnocentric 












2.2 Formulating Hypotheses 
There has been a great expansion in research on attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa 
and elsewhere in the world. Evidence of increasingly negative public attitudes towards 
immigrants abound in many research reports. This chapter provides an overview of the 
existing evidence on factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants. It is based on a review 
of the evidence available from research, opinion polls, and social surveys undertaken in 
South Africa and elsewhere. 
 
The factors influencing attitudes towards immigrants are highly complex and frequently 
inter-related. A related difficulty is that these factors often reflect an individual’s broader 
view, which develops over time and is based on a whole range of factors, which are 
additional to those which are immediate or obvious. Given the complexity of attitude 
formation, Hernes and Knudsen (1996) have constructed a model which offers a useful 
framework for identifying the factors that influence attitudes. According to this model there 
are a number of structural factors that provide the context within which group or individual 
attitudes are formed. These include: social and economic structure – housing market, labour 
market, education system, and government welfare arrangements; national culture – which 
include common beliefs and established relations with other nations and cultures; and the 
proportion and degree of integration of immigrants. 
 
Within this overall context, Hernes and Knudsen identify a number of individual socio-
economic and demographic attributes that potentially have an important influence on 
individual and group attitudes towards immigrants. These include labour market position, 
which refers to income and occupation or class; educational background; individual 
demographic characteristics such as age, gender and race; and values, for example, religious 
and political beliefs, sympathy towards development issues and openness to non-indigenous 
cultures. The model and theoretical analysis provided by Hernes and Knudsen suggests that it 
is a combination of these individual factors, combined with a number of subjective factors, 
which include the perceived fairness of government policies together with the actual or 













The researcher uses Hernes and Knudsen’s framework together with evidence from previous 
studies, specifically examining factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants, to formulate 
hypotheses that are testable with the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS 2009 
henceforth) data. 
2.2.1 Cultural Factors Affecting Attitudes towards Immigrants 
Hypothesis 1 
Respondents in Cape Town are more likely to exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants 
from other African countries compared to immigrants from Europe and North America. 
Throughout much of its history South Africa’s immigration policies were tailored to benefit 
immigrants from North America and Europe, while at the same time they did not welcome 
immigrants from other African countries. Under the South African migrant labour system 
Africans from other African states where not regarded as immigrants, but as contract workers 
(Spiegel, 1980; Dodson and Crush, 2004; Crush, 2008). This pattern was significantly altered 
with the advent of democracy in 1994. In post-apartheid South Africa, the increase of 
immigrants from other African countries has resulted in perverse attitudes towards African 
immigrants (compared with the attitudes towards immigrants from North America and 
Europe). The increase in the numbers of Africans immigrating to South Africa has proven to 
be an important determinant of South Africans’ attitudes towards immigrants and 
immigration related issues like employment (Morris, 1998). Thus, the researcher 
hypothesises that people in South Africa are more likely to exhibit negative attitudes towards 
immigrants from other African countries. 
 
The apartheid system of classifying people had an indelible effect on social order, and has 
made constructing a new South African national identity very difficult, (Landau et al., 2004; 
Neocosmos, 2008). This has also affected attitude formation about immigrants, with South 
Africans exhibiting more negative attitudes towards immigrants from other African countries 
than towards those from Europe or North America. This argument suggests that attitudes 
towards immigrants are linked to ethnocentrism and racism. Undoubtedly, individual 
experiences under apartheid affected how South Africans understand others. The argument 
that attitudes towards immigrants have their basis in apartheid’s system of classifying people 
presents an interesting hypothesis. However, the researcher was not able to test the effect of 
















Black respondents are more likely to exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigrants 
compared to coloured or white respondents. 
It is also important to consider the role of the respondent’s race as an influence on their 
attitude towards immigrants. An individual’s race not only influences his or her perceptions 
about the impact of immigration on the economy and society, but also those who are ‘non-
white’ are more likely to be in contact with people who are ‘non-white’, than white people 
are; and to be directly affected by negative or racist attitudes associated with immigration. 
Data from surveys conducted in the West also identifies significant racial differences in 
attitudes towards immigrants and immigration issues. 
 
It is often difficult to ascertain how opinions vary by race because categories may differ in 
questionnaires, or there is a mismatch between how people (respondents) categorise 
themselves and how others (interviewers) classify them. South African racial categories fall 
into four broad groups: black, coloured, white and Indian. Survey research suggests that 
attitudes towards immigrants are similar across racial groups (Mattes et al., 1999 and Crush 
et al., 2008). These findings are inconsistent with case studies on attitudes towards 
immigrants that identify different attitudes among the racial groups (Everatt, 2010; Misago et 
al., 2010) In 2008 the SAMP published quantitative data, showing the extent of hostility 
towards immigrants, in South Africa. Follow up qualitative research undertaken by Everatt 
(2010) found that although there are strong similarities in the nature and causes of negative 
attitudes across race, the extent of hostility and the ways in which it is expressed varies, in 
some cases considerably, as a result of local factors and issues. 
 
South Africa is a country of extreme economic and social inequalities, and the gap between 
the poor and the rich is profound. Based on the United Nations Development Programme 
(hereafter UNDP) Gini Coefficient measure of income inequality, South Africa ranks tenth in 
the world
6
. Inequality continues to rise in post-apartheid South Africa, and most cities in 
South Africa have experienced mass urbanisation and political transformation without 
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substantial changes in material circumstances. This has led some researchers to argue that 
persisting inequalities in South Africa give rise to negative attitudes towards immigrants and 
the related violence (Burns, 2008). 
 
Earlier studies suggest that poor urban black South Africans are most critical of differences in 
wealth (Seekings, 2005; Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). This is because expectations of 
change, after the advent of democracy, were high among the previously disadvantaged 
population groups. The demise of apartheid has resulted in many black South Africans who 
are yearning for education, housing, urban services and political rights (National Crime 
Prevention Strategy, 1996; Nattrass & Seekings, 1998) to feel ignored by their government. 
Thus, the researcher hypothesises that black respondents are more likely to exhibit negative 
attitudes towards immigrants than coloured or white respondents are. 
 
It is also worth noting here that many opinion polls conducted, in the West on, attitudes 
towards immigrants identify significant differences in attitude according to the socio-
demographic characteristics of the respondents. The findings in relation to the role of these 
factors are often contradictory. Socio-demographic variables in this study include age, 
education, income, gender and language. In this section, the researcher looks at the impact of 
age and gender on attitudes towards immigrants. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
The gender of respondents may affect attitudes towards immigrants. 
The role of gender in shaping attitudes towards immigrants is perhaps the least understood 
factor. Some researchers have examined the influence of gender on attitudes towards 
immigrants and have found that immigration affects men and women differently. Espenshade 
and Calhoun (1993) found that females exhibit more negative attitudes towards 
undocumented immigrants than males. Citrin, Reingold and Green (1990) also found that 
females were more hostile towards immigrants than males. Other studies suggest that 
immigrants present more competition for women, as women tend to be employed in service 
occupations doing menial work (Hernes and Knudsen, 1992; Palmer, 1996). However, Hood 
et al. (1997) found gender to have no effect on attitudes towards immigrants. While gender 












consensus has emerged in the literature. Because of these limited findings, the researcher 
controls for gender, but has no prior expectations concerning the direction of the relationship. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
Due to cohort effect age is not a determinant of attitudes towards immigrants among 
respondents (young adults) in Cape Town. 
The role of age in shaping attitudes towards immigrants is also contradictory. In theory at 
least, it might be expected that there would be a strong relationship between age and attitudes 
because age is a direct measure of life experience; because it captures the cohort effect and 
because age reflects an individual’s position in a person’s economic life cycle. Previous 
research suggests that older respondents exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigrants 
and immigration related issues, than their younger counterparts (Citrin, Reingold and Green, 
1990; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993). Older people may feel that they must now compete 
with immigrants for established welfare benefits. Parallel arguments hold for young people 
who are in the process of becoming established, in both the housing and labour market, as 
they may perceive themselves to be competing with immigrants. Since the fifth wave of the 
CAPS is based on a cohort of young adults, the researcher does not expect to find any 
relationship between age and attitudes towards immigrants. 
 
2.2.2 Economic and Social Factors Affecting Attitudes towards Immigrants  
Economic theories about attitudes towards immigration not only dominate popular 
explanations of anti-immigrant sentiments, but also many scholarly studies of public 
attitudes. Several western scholars have found that the economic threat posed by immigrants 
affects nationals’ attitudes towards immigrants (Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Hood et al., 
1997). According to the labour market hypothesis, unemployment and insecurity in the labour 
market are characterised by an increase in negative attitudes towards immigrants (Citrin et 
al., 1997). The labour market hypothesis postulates that poor, less-educated nationals are 
more likely to relate increased immigration to increased job competition, and this perception 
of threat may lead people to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants. These 
perceptions may be warranted, given the relatively low occupational skills and educational 














Respondents who fear increased job competition from immigrants, will exhibit stronger 
negative attitudes towards immigrants. 
A common explanation of the hostility towards immigrants in South Africa is that of 
competition for limited resources, most notably employment opportunities and housing. The 
level of unemployment in a country is argued to be the main social context factor that affects 
attitudes towards immigrants. Western studies suggest that immigrants, in particular, are 
perceived as threatening a national’s chance of employment in areas of above average 
unemployment (Hernes and Knudsen, 1992; Palmer, 1996). With an official/strict 
unemployment rate of 24 percent (Statistics South Africa, 2011: vi), it is perhaps inevitable 




The issue of immigrants (documented and undocumented) finding work in this country, while 
South Africans are unable to do so, further compounds tensions – between immigrants and 
nationals - and may create a constituency for populist politicians (Misago et al., 2010). A 
national study of unemployment among young adults in South Africa, found that 
unemployment in South Africa is disproportionately concentrated among poor, black South 
Africans (Centre for Development Enterprise, 2007; 2008). The study found that in South 
Africa young black adults tend to be unemployed for longer periods, and are burdened with 
the responsibility to support their immediate and extended family once they have completed 
their studies. The researchers concluded that unemployment presents a massive challenge to 
economic, political and social stability in South Africa, because the frustration associated 
with unemployment creates the potential for social unrest. Their study found that young 
adults, who remained unemployed for long periods, become dissatisfied with their lives, 
which may lead to antisocial behaviour. Evidence coming out of the fifth wave of the Cape 
Area Panel Study (CAPS 2009 hereafter) on young adults in Cape Town, also highlights 
significant levels of inequality in relation to some economic indicators (see Appendix 2). As 
such, the researcher expects to find that respondents who fear job competition from 
immigrants will exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigrants than respondents who do 
not. 
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The frequency with which the media and politicians in South Africa, frame the debate about 
immigration issues in economic terms, also raises the question whether public opinion 
towards immigrants is based on economic concerns. Earlier studies have shown that many 
immigrants in South Africa are more qualified, more experienced, and willing to work for 
lower wages than nationals (McDonald et al., 1999; Ulicki and Crush, 2000; Landau et al., 
2005). Thus, immigrants, who accept lower wages, have the potential to push down the 
wages of those South African nationals who are employed. Because South Africa grapples 
with high levels of unemployment, immigrants present serious competition, particularly to 
economically disadvantaged and low-skilled South Africans. It is perhaps inevitable that the 
threat of competition in the labour market is often given as the basis of widespread negative 
attitudes towards immigrants. This study provides an opportunity to test the interplay of 
economic motives and attitudes towards immigrants. 
 
Hypothesis 6 
Less affluent and less-educated respondents will exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards 
immigrants. 
The presence of this type of economic threat – job competition – can be gauged using 
standard indicators of income and education. Higher levels of education and income are often 
associated with stronger positive perceptions of immigrants, and support for a more liberal 
immigration policy. These attitudes develop as a result of the “liberalizing” influence of 
education (Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993). 
 
Curiously, Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) found no relation between socio-economic status 
and attitude formation, whilst Palmer (1996) found an inverse relationship between socio-
economic status and attitudes towards immigrants. The latter findings suggest that middle 
class and upper class respondents may perceive immigrants as a socio-economic threat. 
People who are successful in the country’s economic system may view low-skilled and less-
educated immigrants as a potential economic drain – because higher taxes and greater 
demands for social services will result because these immigrants will be an added burden on 
the state. For the purposes of this study the researcher expects to find those respondents with 














Respondents who fear that immigrants are an economic threat will exhibit more negative 
attitudes towards immigrants. 
The inadequacy and inefficiency related to service delivery in South Africa, has generated 
theories that explain attitudes towards immigrants in relation to poor service delivery. South 
Africa faces housing shortages of crisis proportions, despite the efforts by the African 
National Congress (hereafter ANC) to provide housing for all. Some researchers have argued 
that neither the state nor the post-apartheid housing policies adequately address housing 
shortages (Gilbert et al., 1993). This is because inadequate living conditions have persisted 
despite massive investments in housing, infrastructure and service delivery. 
 
To some extent, housing shortages reflects rural migration into urban areas. On the other 
hand, the rate of delivery has not only been slow, but also many poor urban dwellers cannot 
afford to own houses, or to meet services and upgrade charges (Gilbert et al., 1993). 
Respondents, who participated in the fifth wave of the CAPS, also highlighted the problem of 
housing in Cape Town (see Appendix 3). 
 
South Africa has a long history of using violence as a means to protest. As such, numerous 
and repeated protests over housing and service delivery are reported in the media and 
research reports. Generally, people tend to blame the problems of housing shortages and 
service delivery on immigrants and politicians (McDonald, 1998; Hadland, 2008) – findings 
supported in other studies (see Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996). These documented 
tensions suggest an increasing hostility towards immigrants, because immigrants are seen as 
adding to the demand for affordable urban housing. 
 
Analysis of post-apartheid housing provision in South Africa suggests there is a growing 
dissatisfaction with the housing policy and housing delivery in the townships and informal 
settlements, as the urban poor continue to live in conditions similar to those that they had to 
endure under apartheid. The housing policies of the ANC government are similar to that tried 
under apartheid (Oldfield, 2000; Lemanski, 2009). Families earning less than R3500 a month 
are eligible for housing subsidies under the post-apartheid government, but the residential 












high transportation costs on already impoverished families, and, in practice, excludes them 
from centres of economic and social opportunity (Oldfield, 2000; Millstein, 2007). 
 
Whereas many South Africans live in townships and informal settlements because they 
cannot afford to live anywhere else, immigrants may be discouraged from entering the formal 
property market because of the social and legal insecurity of their position (Dobson and 
Oelofse, 2002; Pillay et al., 2008; Cooper, 2009). Earlier research suggests that the issue of 
immigrants settling in townships and informal settlements compounds the housing problem, 
and increases the potential for conflict over materials resources (Dobson and Oelofse, 2000, 
Pillay et al., 2008). These immigrants include refugees, who are not settled in controlled 
camps and have unrestricted mobility, as in other countries, (McDonald, 1998). 
 
Furthermore, a commitment by the post-apartheid government to protect and guarantee 
protection and socio-economic services to anyone living within the country’s borders has, in 
some instances, challenged the public administration’s managerial and financial resources 
(Landau et al., 2004). This has resulted in problems of service delivery and public 
frustrations. Claims that the government is spending millions in assisting immigrants – or that 
immigrants are otherwise burdening the government – provide a ready excuse for such 
shortcomings (Everatt, 2010). Public frustrations may turn to violence because a set of beliefs 
and ideologies exist among South Africans, which indicate that a situation is unfair and that 
taking action to bring about change is justified (Cooper, 2009). 
 
On the other hand, earlier studies have found that South Africans living in the townships are 
often tempted to sell or lease their properties because they have such low incomes (Dobson 
and Oelofse, 2000; Pillay et al., 2008). Through these processes, immigrants have gained 
access to housing in many urban townships across the country. Selling state funded houses to 
immigrants not only worsens housing shortages but foments community tensions based on 
material concerns (McDonald, 1998; Dobson and Oelofse, 2000). The presence of highly 
visible immigrants in South Africa, most of who are seen to be in competition for privately 
rented accommodation, often exacerbates an already difficult situation, and could lead to 
hostility towards immigrants. Based on this, the researcher hypothesises that respondents who 
feel vulnerable, in terms of material well-being, are more likely to exhibit stronger negative 













Hypothesis 8  
Respondents who have experienced violence at home and outside the home will exhibit 
stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants.  
Political discourse in South Africa regularly portrays immigrants as criminals. The dominant 
view among South Africans is that immigrants threaten their property and physical security. 
Some researchers have even argued that the vigilante action – often associated with attitudes 
towards immigrants – is born out of a feeling that the police are not doing their job (Morris et 
al., 1999). Empirical data, however, show no areas in which immigrants contribute more to 
crime than South Africans. Findings from a national study suggest that immigrants are 
disproportionately victims of crime rather than perpetrators of crime (McDonald et al., 1999). 
This suggests that violence against immigrants is considered a normal way of interacting in 
South Africa (McDonald et al., 1999; Sigsworth et al., 2008). Immigrants have become the 
target to blame for social ills and personal frustrations that are linked to a sense of relative 
deprivation, which arises because people believe that they are getting less than they are 
entitled (Morris 1998, Tshitereke, 1999; Harris, 2002). It is unclear why immigrants come to 
represent deprivation, poverty and unemployment in South Africa, given the role of 
immigration in the development of the South African economy, as discussed by several 
researchers (McDonald et al., 1999, Posel, 2003, Crush and Frayne, 2007). 
 
On the other hand, a national study among immigrants living in South Africa conducted by 
the SAMP revealed that immigrants are often harassed by the South African Police Service 
(SAPS hereafter). Immigrants who have had the misfortune of having a run in with the police 
spoke of the need to have money for bribes in order to escape summary arrest, the destruction 
of identity documents or being deported (McDonald et al., 1999; Misago et al., 2010). 
Findings from these studies suggest that immigrants living in South Africa felt safer in their 
home country and found the crime situation in South Africa worse than that at home. Similar 
findings were found in studies conducted in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, in which 
respondents identified their home country as a better place to raise a family than South 













Crime is endemic in South Africa. The 2006 South African Social Attitude Surveys (SASAS) 
found that South African are substantially more fearful to walk in their neighbourhoods 
during the day and at night  (Davids and wa Kivilu, 2008; Roberts, 2008). Fear of crime 
among men was also reported to have matched, and in some instances surpassed that of 
women. Statistics from the SAPS annual report suggests that in 2009/2010 over 676,445 
violent crimes were reported, including 16,834 murders, 113,755 robberies with aggravating 
circumstances, 205,293 assaults with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm and 68,332 sexual 
offences. 
 
However, de Kock (1990) has argued that undocumented immigrants may influence the level 
of crime by contributing to unemployment, through fraud relating to the issuing of identity 
documents, by reacting to exploitation, and by becoming involved in violent crime (de Kock, 
1990:35). This could lead to undocumented immigrants being characterised as criminals, 
which could encourage vigilante justice and exacerbate already negative attitudes towards 
immigrants (Klaaren and Ramji, 2001). 
 
Undocumented immigrants are the most vulnerable to abuses, because they are liable to be 
prosecuted and then deported for violating South Africa’s immigration laws (Bloch, 2008). In 
South Africa, support for deportation is reported to be high, with nearly 50 percent of 
respondents who participated in a national study supporting the policy of deporting 
immigrants even those who live in the country legally (Crush et al., 2008). On the other hand, 
the Department of Home Affairs (hereafter DHA) actively pursues the arrest and deportation 
of undocumented immigrants. The DHA’s (2009) annual report for 2008/2009 indicates that 
280,837 people were deported from South Africa
8
. Evidently, the extent to which the rights 
of immigrants are abused and violated relates to their immigration status (Human Rights 
Watch, 1998; McDonald, 2000, Klaaren and Ramji, 2001, Bloch, 2008, Amit, 2010). 
Undocumented immigrants are often perceived as a potential fiscal burden, because they are 
seen as adding to the already heavy demands on social services.  
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Fundamental to understanding violence are the risk factors that enhance the likelihood of a 
person or people engaging in violence or becoming victims of violence. The pattern of 
criminal violence in South Africa is rooted in the country’s history of a violent and 
authoritarian regime (de Kock, 1990; Hamber, 1990; McKendrick and Hoffman, 1990; 
Morris et al., 1999). Other factors, which contribute to the high level of violent crime in 
South Africa, include access to firearms, a political culture of violence and crime, poverty, 
unemployment and youth marginalisation (Simpson and Rauch, 1993).  
 
In post-apartheid South Africa, however, most cities have experienced an influx of migrants 
from the rural areas, such that levels of unemployment are higher in predominantly urban 
areas. The loss of support systems associated with rural areas and the relative deprivation 
associated with the development of urban consumer habits may result in people resorting to 
crime in order to satisfy their newly acquired expectations (de Kock, 1990; Thaler, 2010b). 
Researchers have argued that many poor South Africans perceive that the post-apartheid 
government has failed to meet the expectations of what political change would bring (Misago 
et al., 2010). Unmet expectations and relative deprivation contribute significantly to violent 
crime and other forms of social conflict. The researcher expects those respondents who have 
experienced violence at home and in their neighbourhood to exhibit stronger negative 
attitudes towards immigrants. 
 
Hypothesis 9 
Young adults are more likely to exhibit pronounced negative attitudes towards undocumented 
immigrants regardless of their personal circumstances.  
Economic variables alone cannot comprehensively measure the threat that South Africans 
perceive immigrants to be. The opinions of individuals may also be influenced by the unique 
immigrant context of their surroundings. For instance, individuals who live in close proximity 
to immigrants (either documented or undocumented) may develop very distinctive attitudes 
towards immigrants as a group. Proponents of the realistic group conflict theory contend that 
increased contact among groups competing for scarce resources serves to intensify the level 
of intergroup conflict. Therefore, following this argument, South Africans who live in areas 
with high concentrations of immigrants might exhibit stronger negative attitudes because 












community. This group threat may lead people to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards 
immigrants. 
 
Another body of literature, which suggests that increased intergroup contact actually leads to 
a reduction in in-group conflict, counters this theoretical approach. Proponents of the contact 
hypothesis contend that as competing groups interact, unrealistic negative perceptions are 
replaced by favourable experiences and more positive attitudes towards the other group. This 
suggests that South Africans living in close proximity to a large number of immigrants would 
exhibit stronger positive attitudes towards immigrants. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, 
the researcher was not able to test this hypothesis. 
 
Some Unites States research has found that the perception of group threat is dependent upon 
the type of immigrant context – documented or undocumented – that is present (Hood et al., 
1997; Hood and Morris, 1998). These studies found that people are supportive of legal 
immigration as the relative size of the legal immigrant population in their area increased; this 
offers support for the contact hypothesis. Conversely, people were found to be less supportive 
of legal immigration as the relative size of the illegal immigrant population in their 
neighbourhood increased, offering support for the realistic group conflict theory. 
 
The media have been found to reflect, and consequently perpetuate, negative stereotypes of 
African immigrants. Researchers argue that the media in South Africa misrepresents the 
numbers of African immigrants entering the country, and the means by which they enter 
(McDonald, 1998; McDonald et al., 1999; Danso and McDonald, 2001). National studies 
conducted in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe show that undocumented immigration is 
less than has been reported in the media (McDonald et al., 2000). Immigrants are also often 
referred to as aliens, illegal immigrants or makwerekwere
9
, terms which form part of a 
negative discourse that blames immigrants for contributing to crime, diseases and 
unemployment (Eyber, 1998). These derogatory terms dehumanise immigrants, and may lead 
to immigrants being marginalised, because they are denied their socio-economic rights and 
excluded from social welfare benefits (McDonald et al., 2000; Neocosmos, 2008). The young 
adults, who participated in the fifth wave of the CAPS, also exhibited high levels of dislike 
for undocumented immigrants (see Appendix 5). Thus, the researcher expects the respondents 
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to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards undocumented immigrants, no matter what the 
circumstances of the respondents. 
2.3 Conclusion  
In summary, the evidence relating to the factors, which influence attitudes towards 
immigrants, suggests that these factors are highly complex and inter-connected. In terms of 
causal factors underlying an individual’s attitude towards immigrants, economic theory 
predicts that negative attitudes will be strongly expressed by those who are most directly 
affected by immigrants competing in the labour market. However, to date the evidence is 
inconclusive, but suggests that there is no clear correlation between attitudes and labour 
market position and income. There is evidence that education plays an important role in 
shaping attitudes towards immigrants and that higher levels of education are associated with 
more positive attitudes. There is also some evidence that attitudes towards immigrants are 
currently becoming more negative among those who are university graduates. The role of 
individual socio-demographic factors, for example, age and gender, in shaping attitudes, are 
not well understood, and the evidence in relation to the role of these factors is largely 
contradictory.  
 














CHAPTER 3: DEPORTATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
IMMIGRANTS 
South Africa has grappled with negative attitudes towards immigrants since the advent of 
democracy in 1994. Increased numbers of documented and undocumented immigrants 
immigrating to the country compound negative attitudes (Morris, 1998). Case studies 
conducted in the aftermath of the violent attacks on immigrants, in May 2008, suggest that 
attitudes towards immigrants are generally negative, with people supporting deportation of 
immigrants from South Africa (Everatt, 2010). 
 
A national study undertaken by the Southern African Migration Project (hereafter SAMP) in 
2006 found that South Africans support the deportation of immigrants, even those who are 
living here legally (47 percent). Respondents also supported the deportation of immigrants 
who do not contribute to the economy (74 percent), as well as those who have committed 
serious criminal offences (86 percent), or who test positive for HIV or have AIDS (61 
percent) (Crush et al., 2008:26). This suggests th t, generally, South Africans support 
restrictive policy measures against immigrants (ibid). 
 
Past surveys have tended to study attitudes towards immigrants, in the abstract, that is 
detached from an individual immigrant’s characteristics or circumstances. Many researchers 
have argued that abstract questions – typical of opinion surveys – fail to take into account the 
complex and multidimensional nature of people’s attitudes (Nosanchuk, 1972; Alexander and 
Becker, 1978; Finch, 1987). One way of incorporating nuanced questions – that make the 
actual questions true to life – is by specifying plausible situations, so instead of abstract 
questions vignettes are used. Finch (1987:105) describes vignettes as “short stories about 
hypothetical characters in specified circumstances, to whose situation the interviewee is 
invited to respond”. 
 
The researcher found no evidence that attitudes studies, in South Africa, have used vignettes 
in the study of attitudes towards immigrants. In Canada, Harell, Soroka and Andrew (2011) 
used a series of vignettes – that vary the racial background and social status of an individual 
applying for immigration – to assess the extent to which manipulating an immigrant’s racial 












immigrant’s economic status affected respondents’ attitudes with respondents expressing a 
preference for higher skilled immigrants. The race of an immigrant did not seem to affect 
respondent’s attitudes. This Canadian study suggests that manipulating the specification of 
immigrant’s characteristics or circumstances in a vignette can matter in the study of attitudes 
towards immigrants. Vignettes are one way of incorporating descriptions, which closely 
resemble real-life situations. Based on two vignettes presented to a representative sample of 
young adults in Cape Town, this chapter examines the extent to which manipulating an 
immigrant’s socio-economic status and nationality affects support for deportation. The 
researcher explores how respondents’ support for the deportation of immigrants varies as 
different characteristics are added to the descriptions of immigrants, that is, differing 
situational contexts. 
3.1 Exploring Attitudes towards Immigrants through Support for 
Deportation 
To test the effect of manipulating the nationality and/or social status of an immigrant on the 
support for deportation, this chapter uses vignettes, because they allow for the 
“contextualisation of opinion, and the ability to test hypotheses about causal effects” (Gibson 
and Gouws, 2003:100). The researcher examines both the cultural and economic threat 
hypotheses, discussed in chapter two, using data from the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel 
Study (CAPS 2009 henceforth). The two vignettes presented to young adults in Cape Town 
assessed the circumstances, which would elicit responses that supported the deportation of 
immigrants. The circumstances described in the vignettes are factors, which, could 
potentially, affect the respondents’ support for deportation of immigrants.  
 
The vignettes began with a general opening statement: “Now I shall describe some situations 
involving immigrants into South Africa.” The first vignette was about an undocumented 
immigrant from Zimbabwe. Manipulating an immigrant’s employment status, HIV status, 
lack of food security
10
 and/or the threat of political persecution
11
 in the home country, 
resulted in twelve versions of the vignette (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Vignette Versions on the Undocumented Zimbabwean Immigrant 
Question Variable Version Variant N 
w5y_i28_1 w5y_i28_2 1 Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant 
here in South Africa. He has no employment, and he is HIV positive. 
235 
2 Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant 
here in South Africa. He has no employment. 
245 
3 Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant 
here in South Africa. He is employed, and he is HIV positive. 
241 
4 Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant 
here in South Africa. He is employed. 
260 
5 Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant 
here in South Africa. He has no employment, and he is HIV positive. 
He will probably be persecuted if he returns to Zimbabwe. 
261 
6 Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant 
here in South Africa. He has no employment. He will probably be 
persecuted if he returns to Zimbabwe. 
257 
7 Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant 
here in South Africa. He is employed, and is HIV positive. He will 
probably be persecuted if he returns to Zimbabwe. 
242 
8 Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant 
here in South Africa. He is employed. He will probably be persecuted 
if he returns to Zimbabwe. 
249 
9 Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant 
here in South Africa. He has no employment, and is HIV positive. His 
family in Zimbabwe is suffering from starvation. 
221 
10 Imagine a young from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in 
South Africa. He has no employment. His family in Zimbabwe is 
suffering from starvation. 
215 
11 Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant 
here in South Africa. He is employed, and is HIV positive. His family 
in Zimbabwe is suffering from starvation. 
264 
12 Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant 
here in South Africa. He is employed. His family in Zimbabwe is 
suffering from starvation. 
225 
 Total 2,915 
 Source: CAPS 2009 
 
The employment and HIV status of the immigrant relate to the economic threat hypothesis: 
respondents who fear increased job competition from immigrants, or who fear that 
immigrants are a fiscal burden are more likely to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards 
immigrants. The starvation and persecution manipulations test the possibility that presenting 
an immigrant in a dire situation may produce a positivity bias: the tendency for people to be 
more compassionate about specific situations than about situations that are more abstract. 
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Allocation of respondents to one of the twelve vignette versions was random, and each 
respondent heard only one version of the vignette. After listening to the vignette, the 
respondents were asked to decide whether an immigrant should or should not be deported to 
Zimbabwe. 
 
The second vignette was about an immigrant family living in South Africa. Manipulating an 
immigrant family’s country of origin
12
 and the social traits exhibited by an immigrant family, 
produced six versions of the vignette (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Vignette Versions on the Immigrant Family 
Question Variable Version Variant N 
w5y_i28_3 w5y_i28_4 1 Imagine a family from Nigeria. They are working in South Africa, 
paying taxes, and their neighbours like them. 
484 
2 Imagine a family from Nigeria living here in South Africa. They do 
not have jobs, and their neighbours complain that they cause trouble. 
504 
3 Imagine a family from Lesotho. They are working in South Africa, 
paying taxes, and their neighbours like them. 
464 
4 Imagine a family from Lesotho living here in South Africa. They do 
not have jobs, and their neighbours complain that they cause trouble. 
488 
5 Imagine a family from Britain. They are working in South Africa, 
paying taxes, and their neighbours like them. 
500 
6 Imagine a family from Britain living here in South Africa. They do 
not have jobs and their neighbours complain that they cause trouble. 
475 
 Total 2,915 
Source: CAPS 2009 
 
The social traits of the immigrant family relate to the economic threat hypothesis, whilst the 
nationality of the immigrant family relates to the cultural threat hypothesis. The nationality 
manipulation relies on just three of many possible nationalities. The objective in using these 
three nationalities was to contrast attitudes towards immigrants from other African countries 
with attitudes towards immigrants from Europe. 
 
Each respondent heard only a single version of the vignette, and allocation of the respondents 
to a particular version of the vignette, was random. After listening to the vignette, the 
respondents were asked to decide, “Should this family be told to leave South Africa?”, in 
other words should the immigrant family be deported or not. 
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Lesotho and others were newer African immigrants from Nigeria. Immigrants from Britain were also included. 
Although the race of the immigrant is unspecified in the vignettes, most South Africans assume that immigrants 












3.1.1 Overall Distribution of Responses 
Table 3 shows the distribution of the responses to the vignettes. A smaller proportion of 
young adults in Cape Town supported the deportation of immigrants, than had been shown in 
earlier studies (Crush, et al., 2008). Support for deportation was not widespread; about one-
third of respondents (35 percent) supported the deportation of an undocumented immigrant, 
and about two-fifths of respondents (39 percent) supported the deportation of an immigrant 
family. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Responses on the Support for Deportation 
 Percent13 
w5y_i28_1 “Should this person be deported back to Zimbabwe?”  
 Yes 35 
 Maybe, it depends 27 
 No 35 
 Don’t know 4 
Total  100 
w5y_i28_3 “Should this family be told to leave South Africa?”  
 Yes 39 
 Maybe, it depends 21 
 No 38 
 Don’t know 3 
Total  100 
Source: CAPS 2009 
3.1.2 Effect of the Manipulations by Vignette Version 
The extent to which the manipulations, specified in the vignette stories, affected the 
respondents’ support for deportation become evident when the researcher considers the 
responses to each version of the vignette. It is overwhelmingly clear that varying an 
immigrant’s circumstances affects the degree of support for the deportation of immigrants. 
The results presented in Table 4 suggest that more respondents supported the deportation of 
an unemployed, HIV positive, undocumented immigrant. This is seen in version one of the 
vignette which shows that the majority of respondents (59 percent) supported the deportation 
of an unemployed, HIV positive, undocumented immigrant. In contrast, twenty-four percent 
of respondents presented with version eight supported deportation. In this case, the immigrant 
was described as employed and facing persecution in Zimbabwe. The results appear to 
support the economic threat hypothesis, in relation to increased job competition or a higher 
fiscal burden from unemployed, HIV positive, undocumented immigrants. However, there is 
not more support for deporting employed immigrants – although they are the ones who have 
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actually ‘taken’ a job that might have been done by a South African. Differences across 




Table 4: Gross Effects of Manipulating the Circumstances of an Undocumented Zimbabwean 
Immigrant by Vignette Version 
 “Should this person be deported back to Zimbabwe?” 














1 Unemployed HIV+ Unspecified Unspecified 59 20 18 2 100 
2 Unemployed Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified 43 31 24 3 100 
3 Employed HIV+ Unspecified Unspecified 37 27 29 7 100 
4 Employed Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified 34 28 37 1 100 
5 Unemployed HIV+ Persecution Unspecified 35 27 33 6 100 
6 Unemployed Unspecified Persecution Unspecified 30 24 41 5 100 
7 Employed HIV+ Persecution Unspecified 29 30 38 3 100 
8 Employed Unspecified Persecution Unspecified 24 30 42 5 100 
9 Unemployed HIV+ Unspecified Starving 43 25 29 3 100 
10 Unemployed Unspecified Unspecified Starving 32 32 34 2 100 
11 Employed HIV+ Unspecified Starving 28 29 40 3 100 
12 Employed Unspecified Unspecified Starving 27 22 47 4 100 
Source: CAPS 2009 
 
The strongest relationship, however, is with the manipulation of an immigrant family’s social 
traits. Table 5 shows the gross effects of manipulating an immigrant family’s country of 
origin and the social traits exhibited by an immigrant family. The results suggest that support 
for deportation is higher in circumstances where the immigrant family exhibited undesirable 
social traits. For example, in the vignette versions where the immigrant family did not have 
jobs and their neighbours complained that they caused trouble – versions two, four and six – 
approximately six out of ten of the respondents supported their deportation. Young adults in 
Cape Town expressed a distinct preference for an immigrant family that worked, paid taxes 
and got along with their neighbours. 
 
The immigrant family’s nationality was apparently irrelevant to the respondents’ decision to 
support deportation; the effect of manipulating the immigrants’ country of origin was 
negligible. There were no differences, whatsoever, in responses which supported deportation, 
based on the nationality of the immigrant family. However, differences across versions were 
statistically significant (p=0.00).  
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Table 5: Effects of Manipulating the Characteristics of an Immigrant Family by Vignette 
Version 
 “Should this family be told to leave South Africa?” 










1 Nigeria  Work, pay taxes and liked by neighbours 12 26 59 4 100 
2 Nigeria  Have no jobs, and cause trouble 66 21 11 2 100 
3 Lesotho Work, pay taxes and liked by neighbours  12 20 66 2 100 
4 Lesotho Have no jobs, and cause trouble 65 18 13 3 100 
5 Britain  Work, pay taxes and liked by neighbours   12 23 62 3 100 
6 Britain  Have no jobs, and cause trouble 65 19 15 2 100 
Source: CAPS 2009 
3.1.3 The Effect of the Manipulations by Immigrant Characteristics and 
Circumstances 
Corroborating with the results presented in tables four and five are the results presented when 
the researcher pooled the responses by creating dummy variables representing the 
manipulations (see Table 6)
 15
. A very important point about table six is that the respondents’ 
judgements, on the support for deportation of an undocumented immigrant, are all in the 
expected direction. More respondents supported the deportation of the unemployed, 
undocumented immigrant, than the employed one; more supported the deportation of the HIV 
positive, undocumented immigrant; fewer people supported the deportation of the 
undocumented immigrant threatened by persecution. Curiously, whether or not an 
undocumented immigrant’s family was starving made a small difference to the assessment. 
 
The differences in support for deportation – based on manipulating the circumstances of an 
undocumented immigrant – were small: the differences varied from 29 percent to 40 percent. 
This suggests that as long as the immigrant was undocumented, a large minority of 
respondents had their minds made up to deport him, regardless of his other characteristics. 
Roughly, a third of the respondents were willing to deport an undocumented immigrant from 
South Africa, despite the threat of persecution (29 percent), or that the family in the home 
country faced starvation (32 percent). This implies that reality does not easily change the 
general predispositions about undocumented, and the rights of undocumented immigrants 
living in this country have a small impact on South Africans’ attitudes towards immigrants. It 
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is also probable that the increased number of documented and undocumented immigrants 
from Zimbabwe, the nationality specified in the vignette, affected the respondents’ 
judgements. 
 
Table 6: The Effects of Manipulating an Immigrant’s Characteristics and Circumstances 
   Percentage  




No, it is 
wrong 






Unemployed 40 26 30 3 1,481 
Employed 30 28 39 4 1,434 
HIV Status  
HIV+ 38 27 32 4 1,464 
Unspecified 31 28 38 3 1,451 
Political 
Persecution 
Persecution 29 28 38 5 1,009 
Unspecified 38 27 33 3 1,906 
Food Security 
Starving 32 27 38 3 925 







Britain  38 21 38 2 975 
Lesotho 39 19 40 2 952 
Nigeria  39 23 35 3 988 
Lifestyle 
Not working  65 19 13 2 1,467 
Working 12 23 62 3 1,448 
Source: CAPS 2009 
 
On the other hand, manipulating an immigrant family’s social traits affected people’s 
judgements on the support for deportation considerably. Differences in support for 
deportation – based on the social trait manipulation – varied between twelve percent and 65 
percent. 
3.2 Summary Statistics and Bivariate Relationships  
The dependent variables, analysed in this chapter, draw on the respondents’ decisions to 
support the deportation of immigrants from South Africa. Each vignette presented specific 
immigrant characteristics in order to see how they affected the respondents’ support for 
deporting immigrants. To this end, the researcher created two dummy variables from the 
responses to the vignettes, deport and expel, coded one (‘‘Yes”) and zero (“Maybe, it 
depends” and “No”). “Don’t know” responses were left out of the analysis because they were 
difficult to conceptualise. 
 
Bivariate regressions using support for deportation as the dependent variable indicate that the 
manipulations, for the undocumented immigrant vignette, achieved statistical significance. 
Researchers who designed the survey instrument correctly perceived the manipulations as 












decisions were effective. The results are consistent with the preceding descriptive statistics, 
with the unemployed and HIV positive immigrant characteristics affecting support for 
deportation positively. For instance, the marginal effect of an undocumented immigrant being 
unemployed (relative to being employed) is that support for deportation increases by eleven 
percentage points (see Appendix 8)
16
. On the other hand, a situation in which the 
undocumented immigrant’s family is starving was negatively associated with support for 
deportation (-0.05; p=0.06; 95% CI -0.09, 0.00)
17
. The results, however, suggest that other 
factors not included in the regression model explain most of the variance in the support for 
deportation – in each case the pseudo r-squared is very low at less than 0.01. 
 
The results also indicate that white respondents (the reference group), as opposed to black 
and coloured respondents, were less likely to support the deportation of an undocumented 
immigrant. About a quarter of white respondents (28 percent) supported the deportation of an 
undocumented immigrant, compared to 37 percent of black and 36 percent of coloured 
respondents (see Appendix 6). Respondents who spoke English at home (the reference group) 
were less likely (29 percent) to support the deportation of an undocumented immigrant, 
compared to respondents who spoke Afrikaans (37 percent) or Xhosa (36 percent). With 
respect to education, respondents with tertiary education (the reference group) were less 
likely (26 percent) to support the deportation of an undocumented immigrant than 
respondents with primary (42) or secondary (35 percent) education only. Language and level 
of education are significant in bivariate regression, though explained variances were small. 
There was no difference in the support for deportation by age, gender and employment status. 
 
As expected, for the second vignette, when an immigrant family exhibited anti-social 
behaviour this had a strong, direct effect on support for deportation. The marginal effect of 
the subject being described as an unemployed and noisy immigrant family who cause trouble 
(compared to an employed immigrant family who get along with their neighbours) is that the 
probability of support for their deportation increased by a massive 45 percentage points (see 
Appendix 9). The immigrant family’s nationality was statistically insignificant in bivariate 
regression. 
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The results also show that other indicator variables, such as language and class were 
significant factors. Respondents who spoke English or Xhosa at home were less likely to 
support the deportation of the immigrant family, compared to respondents who spoke 
Afrikaans (the reference group). About two fifths (44 percent) of respondents who spoke 
Afrikaans at home supported the deportation of an immigrant family compared to 38 percent 
and 31 percent of respondents who spoke English or Xhosa, respectively. Upper (40 percent) 
and middle (39 percent) class respondents were more likely to support the deportation of an 
immigrant family compared to respondents in the working class (32 percent) category (the 
reference group).The explained variances are small. 
3.3 Multivariate Regression Results 
The researcher used multivariate regression models to determine whether the influence of the 
manipulations withstood the imposition of controls, and to interpret more fully causal 
underpinnings of the respondents’ attitudes. The researcher tested a number of assumptions 
thought to connect an individual immigrant’s characteristics or circumstances and attitudes 
towards immigrants. The analytical strategy was to introduce, sequentially, several distinct 
categories of explanatory variables as predictors. This approach – usually called hierarchical 
or nested analyses – enabled the researcher to test whether the inclusion of particular clusters 
of related variables improved the fit of the regression. 
 
The first model (Model I) only incorporated the manipulations and assessed the impact of 
varying the immigrant’s characteristics on attitudes towards immigrants. The next step was to 
add demographic variables, such as age, gender, and population group. The model tested the 
hypothesis that socio-demographic characteristics may affect attitudes towards immigrants. 
Two additional models explored the effect of economic variables (Model III) and subjective
18
 
variables (Model IV) as predictors. These models assessed the impact of socio-economic 
status and the social milieu on attitudes towards immigrants. 
 
The analysis employed the same set of specifications for the two dependent variables. The 
researcher, discusses the results of the undocumented immigrant vignette first, and then 
points out the differences that resulted from analysing the immigrant family vignette. All 
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estimates draw on probit analysis techniques, and, unless stated, all predictors are dummy 
variables. Positive regression marginal effects mean that respondents with this characteristic 
support the deportation of immigrants from South Africa more than the reference group. 
3.3.1 Support for Deportation of an Undocumented Zimbabwean Immigrant 
Model I, which includes the vignette manipulations only, revealed that the effects of varying 
an immigrant’s characteristics and circumstances are statistically significant. The results 
indicated that the marginal effect of an immigrant being unemployed (as opposed to being 
employed) increased the probability of support for deportation, by ten percentage points, 
controlling for other factors (see Appendix 10). On the other hand, the marginal effect of the 
threat of persecution (rather than this being unspecified) decreased the probability of support 
for deportation by eleven percentage points, controlling for other factors. The results suggest 
that manipulating the socio-economic status of an immigrant affects the respondents’ support 
for deportation of individual immigrants. Respondents exhibited stronger negative attitudes 
towards an unemployed or HIV positive undocumented immigrant and showed compassion 
to an immigrant threatened by persecution, or an immigrant whose family was starving in the 
home country. The model does not explain much of the variation in support for deportation – 
pseudo r-squared is low at less than 0.03. The manipulations suggest some aspects of 
causality but only indirectly. 
 
Model II, which includes the respondent’s demographic characteristics as predictors, revealed 
that the manipulations remain significant even after the imposition of controls for background 
characteristics. As suggested by the first hypothesis, being black is statistically significantly 
associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants (0.44; p=0.01; 95% CI 0.13; 0.74). 
This finding from Cape Town counters the finding made by Crush et al. (2008), for South 
Africa as a whole, that attitudes towards immigrants are similar across racial groups. In 
comparison to white respondents (the omitted race category), black respondents were more 
likely to express support for deportation. Being coloured (relative to being white) was not 
statistically associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants. In this case, direct 
interaction with immigrants might explain why black respondents were more likely to support 
the deportation of an undocumented immigrant compared to white (or coloured) respondents, 
because black South Africans in Cape Town are more likely to interact with immigrants 
compared to white (or white) South Africans. When the researcher considered the effect of 












95% CI 0.09, 0.69) or English (0.32; p=0.03; 95% CI 0.02, 0.62) at home were more likely to 
support the deportation of an undocumented immigrant compared to respondents who spoke 
Xhosa, contradicting the effect of race on attitude formation. The reason for this contradiction 
was not clear. The results also indicated that age and gender do not affect the respondents’ 
judgement on the support for deportation. It is probable that the effect of age reflects a cohort 
effect, rather than an age effect. Overall, the effect of adding demographic variables to the 
model are small, as the pseudo r-squared is still under 0.04. 
 
Low socio-economic status – both lived and perceived poverty – does not appear to be 
associated with attitudes towards immigrants. Regarding basic economic issues, self-
perceived class – which the researcher assumed would capture the non-job-related dimension 
of an individual’s material level of living – employment status and level education were not 
statistically significant as factors that affect the support for deportation. The results counter 
the sixth hypotheses that less affluent and less educated respondents are more likely to exhibit 
stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants. Curiously, respondents who reported that 
they would accept a job that paid less than R3000 per month, were more likely to support the 
deportation of an undocumented immigrant (0.09; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.04, 0.14), compared to 
respondents who said that they would not accept low status employment. The results appear 
to support the fifth hypothesis that respondents who fear increased job competition from 
immigrants are more likely to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants. 
Overall, the effect of economic variables is minimal; the predicting power raised the pseudo 
r-squared from three percent to four percent. The manipulations remain statistically 
significant, including language and race of the respondent. However, the intermediate models 
(Models II and III in Appendixes 10 and 11) suggest misleading findings, as indicated by the 
findings in the final model (Model IV).   
 
In contrast to theories that stress the role of economic motives in shaping attitudes towards 
immigrants, other personal issues affect people’s opinions. Model IV shows that subjective 
variables, which lie beneath negative attitudes toward immigrants, are also a significant 
concern. As expected, respondents who reported that they disliked undocumented immigrants 
supported for the deportation of the undocumented immigrant. Respondents with low self-
esteem were more likely to support for deportation compared to those who had high self-












also more likely to support for deportation compared to those who trusted others (0.16; 
p=0.00; 95% CI 0.11, 0.20). Having experienced violence outside the home also increased 
the respondents’ probability for supporting deportation (0.06; p=0.01; 95% CI 0.01, 0.12). 
Curiously, respondents who reported that they did not feel safe walking in their 
neighbourhood during the day and at night were less likely to support the deportation of an 
undocumented immigrant compared to those who reported that they felt safe (-0.10; p=0.00; 
95% CI -0.15, -0.04). Overall, the model explained eight percent of the variation on the 
support of an undocumented immigrant, and the manipulations remain statistically 
significant. 
 
3.3.2 Support for Deportation of an Immigrant Family 
Social traits of an immigrant family, manipulated in the vignette, had a marked effect on 
respondents’ support (or lack of support) for deportation. The immigrant family’s nationality 
did not affect attitudes towards immigrants. Unlike the manipulations related to the 
undocumented immigrant vignette, Model I on the immigrant family vignette explained 25 
percent of the variance in support for deportation (see Appendix 11). The manipulations were 
more successful in terms of generating differential intolerance. 
 
Concerning demographic variables, age, gender and race consistently failed to be predictors 
of judgements for or against the deportation of immigrants among respondents. However, 
language remained a statistically significant predictor of attitudes towards immigrants. 
Support for deportation was lower among respondents who spoke Xhosa at home (-0.23; 
p=0.04; 95% CI -0.46, -0.01) compared to respondents who spoke Afrikaans (the omitted 
category). The results suggest that the vignettes measured different attitudinal dimensions, as 
there was inconsistency in the factors that affect support for deportation. Overall, the effect of 
demographic variables was minimal. Demographic variables improved the strength of the 
model by less than one percent. 
 
In Model III, the absolute value of the marginal effects of the race variable increased. 
Coloured and white respondents were less likely to support deportation compared to black 
respondents (the omitted group), though the variation was small as the 95 percent confidence 
intervals were large. This means that we cannot be certain that race improves our 












Unemployed respondents were more likely to support the deportation of an immigrant family 
compared to employed respondents (the reference group). Willingness to accept a low status 
job remained positive and statistically significant. The results appear to support hypothesis 
seven that fear of economic threat affects attitudes towards immigrants. Income variables, 
however, do not explain much of the variance on the support for deportation of an immigrant 
family, the pseudo r-squared increased by less than one percent. 
 
In Model IV, all subjective variables, low self-esteem, lack of trust, dislike for undocumented 
immigrants, feeling unsafe in the neighbourhood and having experienced violence, were 
statistically significant. The explanatory power of the model increases by two percent. The 
social traits manipulation remains statistically significant  
3.4 Discussion 
The results presented in this chapter support several conclusions. The most significant 
observation is that the manipulations of the vignettes had unequal effects on support for 
deportation. However, the findings are consistent with an interpretation suggested earlier, that 
the two vignettes measure somewhat different attitudinal dimensions. 
 
Secondly, manipulating an individual immigrant’s characteristics and circumstances affects 
people’s attitudes towards immigrants, but not in direct and simple ways. The undocumented 
immigrant vignette suggested that South Africans, in general, share the same attitudes 
towards undocumented immigrants. The undocumented immigrant status affects attitude 
formation negatively, because people have pre-existing perceptions about undocumented 
immigrants, which shape their degree of tolerance. Young adults in Cape Town live in a 
society in which undocumented immigrants are portrayed as aliens. Thus attempts to sway 
the respondents’ opinion, by presenting life-threatening situations, had a small impact. Such, 
general attitudes about immigrants are extremely important because they shape how people 
perceive immigrants. On the other hand, immigrants who contribute positively to society 
were more likely to be tolerated than immigrants who exhibited undesirable social traits, 
which suggests that the perception that immigrants are a fiscal burden to tax payers affected 
attitudes towards immigrants. In this instance, the economic status of immigrants is a more 














Thirdly, the effects of the respondents’ individual predictor variables had inconsistent effects 
on the support for deportation. There were no clearly definable traits in terms of who exhibits 
attitudes towards immigrants. Respondents’ demographic characteristics and economic 
perceptions were not significantly associated with the support for deportation. So while 
people may give poverty and unemployment primacy in their accounting of the causes of 
attitudes towards immigrants, low socio-economic status has only indirect effects on attitude 
formation. Subjective variables were significant determinants of how young adults in Cape 
Town evaluate the deportation of immigrants from South Africa. The most salient respondent 
traits were low self-esteem, lack of trust, experience of violence outside the home, and dislike 













CHAPTER 4: LOOTING AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
IMMIGRANTS 
Chapter three revealed that support for the deportation of immigrants from South Africa, as 
measured in the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS 2009 henceforth), is lower 
among young adults who live in Cape Town than was measured in earlier national studies. 
Approximately one fifth of the CAPS 2009 respondents (21 percent) supported the 
deportation of immigrants compared to 47 percent in the Southern African Migration Project 
(SAMP hereafter) 2006 study. Most CAPS 2009 respondents exhibited compassion towards 
immigrants in difficult situations. The evidence from earlier studies was that South Africans 
exhibited negative attitudes towards immigrants as a group. The discrepancies between the 
two studies may arise from the CAPS 2009 depiction of immigrants in real-life scenarios. 
Furthermore, the CAPS 2009 survey, which draws on situational factors thought to affect 
South Africans’ attitudes towards immigrants, used vignettes to elicit the respondents’ 
support (or lack of support) for the deportation of immigrants. 
4.1 Exploring attitudes towards immigrants through the morality of looting 
This chapter assesses attitudes towards immigrants among young adults who were living in 
Cape Town by testing their opinion about the morality of looting. Across South Africa, the 
government is confronted with the serious problem of South Africans looting small 
businesses owned by African immigrants. Such looting has accompanied anti-immigrant 
campaigns in urban townships and informal settlements. Several studies have reported on 
intermittent and persistent attacks of small immigrant businesses (Peberdy and Rogerson, 
2000; Reitzes and Bam, 2000; Cooper, 2009; Misago et al., 2010). There is evidence that, in 
some instances, immigrants have been killed (Cooper, 2009; Misago et al., 2010). Some 
researchers (de Kock, 1997; Misago, 2008; Misago et al., 2010) have argued that the problem 
of looting in this country is compounded by the lack of an adequate deterrent in the criminal 













On the other hand, immigrants claim that South Africans resent them for their ability to 
operate successful small businesses (Morris, 1998). On their arrival in South Africa, many 
immigrants often discover that finding a job is more difficult than establishing a small 
business. Self-employment becomes the most feasible option for earning a living. Other 
studies have also found that immigrants make their own opportunities (Reitzes and Bam, 
2000). 
 
There has been little research on the norms relating to the use of violence against immigrant 
entrepreneurs. Some researchers have argued that looting of immigrant businesses in South 
African townships and informal settlements is a result of the lack of job opportunities. 
Lacking employment and living in poverty causes frustration. This is compounded by 
aspirations, deprivation and urban needs (de Kock, 1990; Reitzes and Bam, 2000; Cooper, 
2009; Misago et al., 2010). 
 
This chapter focuses on a vignette included in the CAPS 2009 that probed whether the 
nationality of the trader affected opinions about the morality of looting. The focus of this 
chapter is to understand the dynamics of looting of African immigrants’ businesses, by 
examining how young adults think about such looting. The findings will be compared to 
views revealed in earlier studies that such looting arise from three main factors: (1) high 
levels of inequality and poverty right across South Africa, (2) political discourse that these 
African immigrants have a negative impact on the well-being of South Africans, and (3) the 
micro-politics of the country’s townships and informal settlements. There appears to be a 
widespread perception among South Africans that immigrants are financially more successful 
than nationals. This perception has led some researchers to argue that relative deprivation 
might be the root cause of attitudes towards immigrants (Cooper, 2009). 
 
The results discussed in chapter three suggested that most respondents showed compassion 
when presented with situations testing for their degree of support for deportation of 
immigrants. The looting vignette explored the moral codes that inform the respondents’ 
degree of support for looting a trader. Two versions specified the nationality of the trader, in 
another version the nationality was unspecified. Also specified in the vignette versions were 
the circumstances for looting (see Table 7). The vignette began with the opening statement 












think that this action is Very bad, Bad, Neither bad nor good, Ok, or Good.” The vignette told 
the story of a trader who operated a small business in a township; the business is looted by a 
group of young men. 
 
Table 7: Looting vignette versions 
Question  Variable   Version Variant N 
w5y_i24_1 w5y_i28_2 1 Young men attack the shop of a Somali shopkeeper in a township, 
saying that the shopkeeper is getting rich by selling to poor people. 
931 
2 Young men attack the shop of a shopkeeper in a township, saying that 
the shopkeeper is getting rich by selling to poor people. 
1,011 
3 Young men attack the shop of a Somali shopkeeper in a township, 
saying that Somalis should not be allowed to run shops. 
973 
 Total  2,915 
Source: CAPS 2009 
4.1.1 Manipulations and Hypotheses 
The vignette clearly implied that there was conflict between poor and rich, which derived 
from economic and social processes in which respondents might feel deprived in some way, 
for example, material possessions, in relation to immigrants. Earlier studies have suggested 
that immigrants who operate small businesses in historically poor urban communities are 
perceived as having achieved a level of economic and social privilege that still eludes many 
South Africans (Cooper, 2009, Misago et al., 2010). Thus, the looting of small businesses 
owned by African immigrants as an attempt to redress an unfair situation may seem 
justifiable. The vignette sought to determine how presenting respondents with a story about 
immigrants, who have acquired some material wealth, would affect judgments as to the 
morality of looting these immigrants’ businesses.  
 
The manipulation of the trader’s nationality tested the cultural threat theory that the 
nationality of the trader affects the respondents’ opinion about looting. Varying the 
circumstances for looting tested the economic threat theory, that fear of economic threat 
affects the respondents’ judgement about looting. The allocation of the three versions of the 
vignette was random. Each respondent heard only one version. After listening to the vignette, 
the respondents made a judgement about whether it was “Very bad”, “Bad”, “Neither bad nor 












4.2 Judgements on Collective Looting 
The pattern of responses to the vignette, as shown in Table 8, suggests that the overwhelming 
majority of respondents (91 percent) did not support looting irrespective of the nationality of 
the trader or the reason for looting. 
 
At first glance, it appears that the vignette failed to generate intolerance, which may suggest 
that it was not a suitable measure for assessing attitudes towards immigrants. The judgements 
of most of the respondents on the morality of looting suggested that they shared a moral 
consciousness that recognises that even immigrants have socio-economic rights. If looting by 
a group of young men was an attempt to address an unfair situation, then the researcher 
would have expected many young adults to support looting. How is it then that the majority 
of the respondents – think it is either “very bad” or “bad” for young men to loot a trader’s 
business? 
 
Table 8: Basic judgments on looting 
Collective looting vignette (w5y_i24_1) Percentage 
“Is it Very bad, Bad, Neither bad nor good, Ok, or Good?”  
Very Bad 44 
Bad 49 
Neither Bad nor Good 5 
OK 1 
Good  1 
Don’t know 1 
Total 100 
Source: CAPS 2009 
 
Manipulating the nationality of the trader and the circumstances for looting do not appear to 
have elicited a larger number of anti-immigrant responses. It is possible that respondents 
were wary of giving negative responses because data collection occurred just after nationwide 
violence against immigrants. 
 
4.2.1 The Effect of the Manipulations 
Despite the finding that the respondents as a group did not condone the looting of an 
immigrant’s business, the manipulation of the nationality factor and the circumstances for 
looting in the three versions of the vignette, produced some variations in judgements about 
looting. The results presented in Table 9 suggest that respondents were slightly more 












nationality was unspecified. Differences across versions using the Chi-squared test were 
statistically significant (p=0.00).  
 
With responses highly skewed in one direction, however, only limited analysis is possible. 
The researcher, therefore, treated the responses “Neither bad nor good”, “Ok” or “Good” as 
exhibiting a negative attitude towards immigrants, because immigrants have the right to 





Table 9: Gross Effects of Manipulating the Immigrant’s nationality and the Circumstances 
for Looting 
“Is it Very bad, Bad, Neither bad nor good, Ok, or Good?” 




Reason for young men 








Ok Good Don’t 
know 
Total 
1 Somali  Getting rich selling to the 
poor 
43 50 4 1 1 0 100 
2 Unspecified  Getting rich selling to the 
poor 
48 47 4 0 1 0 100 
3 Somali Somalis should not be 
allowed to run shops 
41 50 6 2 1 1 100 
Source: Cape Area Panel Study 2009 
 
4.3 Summary Statistics and Bivariate Relationships 
Concerning socio-demographic variables, more men (10 percent) compared to women (4 
percent) supported looting (see Appendix 12). Support for looting was slightly higher among 
black respondents, and respondents who spoke Xhosa at home. Both language and population 
group were significant in bivariate regression (see Appendix 13). Among black respondents, 
thirteen percent supported looting compared to seven percent of coloured and two percent of 
white respondents. Respondents who spoke Xhosa at home were also more likely to support 
deportation (0.07; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.05, 0.09) compared to respondents who spoke Afrikaans 
or English (the omitted groups). Language and race were highly correlated (r=0.99), and only 
the effect of race is considered in the multivariate regression models. Support for looting was 
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slightly higher among older respondents – aged between 27 and 35 years – (8 percent), 
though age was not significant in bivariate regressions. 
 
Our findings are that four percent of respondents in the upper class category support looting, 
compared to nine percent in the middle class category and eight percent in the working class 
category, support the eighth hypothesis: respondents who fear economic threat from 
immigrants are more likely to exhibit stronger negative attitudes. Low socio-economic status 
does appear to be associated with support for looting, and applies to both lived and perceived 
poverty. Middle income earning (R1751-R5000) and high income earning (R5001+) 
respondents were less likely to support looting than low income earning respondents (R101-
1750). Respondents who had some secondary and/or tertiary education were also less likely 
to support looting, compared to respondents who only had primary education (the omitted 
category). This supports hypothesis six: that less affluent and less educated respondents will 
exhibit pronounced negative attitudes towards immigrants. Respondents who reported that 
they would accept a low-status job that paid less than R3000 a month were also more likely 
to support looting (0.07; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.05, 0.09), compared to those who said they would 
not (the omitted group). Respondents in the upper class category were less likely to support 
looting (-0.05; p=0.00; 95% CI -0.07, -0.03), compared to respondents in the middle and 
working class categories (the reference group). 
 
It is also possible that poverty is associated with other mediating factors such as 
neighbourhood environment. Respondents who reported feeling nervous, hopeless, fidgety, 
depressed, everything was an effort, or worthless (conceptualised as low self-esteem), were 
more likely to support looting (0.06; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.04, 0.09), compared to those who did 
not. As expected, respondents who reported that they disliked undocumented immigrants (the 
omitted group) were more likely to support looting than respondents who reported that they 
liked undocumented immigrants (-0.06; p=0.00; 95% CI -0.09, -0.04) or respondents who 
reported neutral feelings (-0.04; p=0.00; CI -0.07, -0.01). Norms may shape violence by 
legitimating attacks against immigrants (the use of violence as a means of resolving conflict). 
Having experienced domestic violence was significantly associated with support for looting 
(0.11; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.08, 0.13), as was having experienced violence outside of the home 












violence because the police and courts are ineffective was positive and significantly 
associated with support for collective looting (0.06; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.04, 0.08). 
 
Bivariate analysis largely supported the hypotheses outlined in chapter two of this study. By 
evaluating the effect of various explanatory variables on the morality of looting, a 
multivariate regression analysis enabled the researcher to determine which groups of people 
exhibited negative attitudes towards immigrants. The study used the vignette as a dependent 
variable in the regression analysis
20
. 
4.4 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
The chosen analytic approach focused on the effect of economic and cultural threat 
perceptions on the respondents’ support for looting. Although structural factors were 
important determinants of attitudes towards immigrants, it was difficult to capture the direct 
impact of shifts in the economic and social structure, since the study is based on cross-
sectional data. The independent variables addressed the assumption that respondents who 
perceived immigrants as worsening the socio-economic position of nationals, would exhibit 
pronounced negative attitudes towards immigrants. 
 
Multivariate probit regression models were used to examine the impact of the various sets of 
variables on attitudes towards immigrants. The results from a sequential regression analysis – 
usually called hierarchical or nested analyses – are reported in appendix fourteen. Model I 
shows results when the nationality of the trader and the circumstances for looting are varied. 
Varying the nationality of the trader relates to the cultural threat hypothesis, whilst the 
circumstances for looting refer to the economic threat hypothesis. Model II shows results 
when demographic variables were included as independent variables. Socio-demographic 
variables address the cultural threat hypothesis. In Model III, labour market variables, which 
relate to the economic threat hypothesis, were added. Model IV displays the effects when all 
the objective variables were included with the subjective explanatory variables. The implicit 
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hypothesis is that people who perceive immigrants as undermining their socio-economic 
well-being will exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants and support looting. 
 
Model I demonstrates that manipulating the nationality of the trader has a significant 
influence on opinion about the morality of looting (p=0.00); varying the circumstances why 
the young men would loot a small trader was not statistically significant (p=0.32). Specifying 
the nationality of the trader had a significant impact on attitudes towards immigrants, and 
supported the first hypothesis that respondents are more likely to exhibit stronger negative 
attitudes towards immigrants from other African countries, particularly when they are 
perceived as worsening the socio-economic position of nationals. The marginal effect of a 
small business being owned by a Somali trader was that the probability of a respondent 
supporting looting rose by three percentage points. However, the 95% confidence intervals 
cross is such that we cannot really be sure that there are real differences in the respondents’ 
normative beliefs relating to looting the Somali trader as opposed to looting anyone else. The 
model has limited explanatory power as it does not explain much of the variation, the pseudo 
r-squared is low, less than 0.02. 
 
The second regression model (Model II) demonstrates that race has a significant influence on 
support for looting. In South Africa, race is often also an indicator of social class and the 
researcher – in this chapter – compared the views of black respondents against those of 
coloured and white respondents (the control group). She did so because: (1) the vignette is 
understood within a township setting – townships are predominantly urban black residential 
areas, and (2) the attitudes of blacks’ dealings with immigrants operating small businesses 
differ substantially from those of coloureds and whites due to the first mentioned propinquity. 
 
Holding other background variables constant, the marginal effect of being black (relative to 
being non-black) is that the probability of supporting collective looting rose by seven 
percentage points. Judging from the regression output, race stands out clearly as having a 
bigger impact on attitudes towards immigrants than gender. In the previous chapter gender 
had no impact on the support for deportation, in the case of looting women were four times 
more likely to support looting compared to men. Western research on the impact of gender on 
attitudes towards immigrants has found contrasting results on the effect of gender on attitudes 












and it is probable that the effect reflects a cohort effect rather than an age effect. An 
explained variance of around seven percent indicates that this simple regression model does 
explain some of the variation at the individual level. 
 
In the next model, Model III, economic variables were added to those already included. 
Economic variables increased the model’s explanatory power by little more than one percent, 
which is not a marked difference. Willingness to accept unskilled labour is the only economic 
variable that affected attitudes towards immigrants (0.04; p=0.00, 95% CI 0.02, 0.06). 
Willingness to accept a job that pays less than R3000 per month, which reflected poverty in 
the researcher’s mind, was significant as a predictor for support for looting. Immigrants 
operating small businesses may be perceived as taking business opportunities from South 
Africans, and consequently worsening the socio-economic situation of South African 
nationals. Such views may lead people to exhibit pronounced negative attitudes towards 
immigrants.  
 
Although the impact of labour market position and class position were in the expected 
direction at the bivariate level, they are not statistically significant at the multivariate level. 
Being unemployed (relative to being employed), as was the case in chapter three, appeared 
not to affect support for looting (0.00; p=0.70; 95% CI -0.02, 0.02); a finding that supported 
the results of other studies (see Schissel et al., 1989). Being in the upper class category 
(relative to being in the middle class or working class category) was not statistically 
significant at the multivariate level. Economic variables in themselves do not appear to play 
an important role in affecting attitudes towards immigrants. The results of this research study 
suggest that public statements based on the economic roots of attitudes towards immigrants 
are counterproductive and do not help solve the social problem of anti-immigrant sentiments 
of many young adults in Cape Town. 
 
The effect of the manipulations and demographic variables shown in Model II is only 
marginally modified when labour market position and income variables are added. 
Manipulating the nationality of the trader and gender continue to show a significant, direct 
effect on attitudes towards immigrants. In Model III, the marginal effect of being black (in 
relation to being non-black) is that support for looting decreases from seven to five 












unskilled labour, as a subjective measure of poverty, improves our ability to predict the 
respondents’ opinion towards looting.  
 
The final model, Model IV, including the subjective variables in the analysis strengthens the 
model significantly. The explained variance increases from 9 percent to 21 percent. The 
subjective variables improve our ability to understand why some respondents do not support 
looting while others do. Variables that reflect the experience of violence (at home and outside 
the home) affect attitudes towards immigrants markedly. For example, the marginal effect of 
having experienced domestic violence increased the probability of supporting for looting by 9 
percentage points. Dislike for undocumented immigrants was another variable that improved 
our ability to predict young adults’ attitudes towards immigrants. Ineffective policing (0.05; 
p=0.00; 95% CI 0.03, 0.08) was regarded as a cause for violence, this may be because the 
South African Police Services (henceforth SAPS) is frequently depicted as corrupt and 
inefficient. De Kock (1997:32) has argued that ineffective policing is compounded by a “low 
police/population ratio, poor community-police relations and inadequate police training”. 
 
The variable measuring the respondents’ feelings of control in the last thirty days, a 
subjective measure for self-esteem, was not statistically significant in the multivariate 
analysis (0.01; p=0.34; 95% CI -0.01, 0.04). The researcher had expected that respondents 
who had expressed feeling any of the following: nervous, hopeless, restless or fidgety, 
depressed, or that everything was an effort or worthless, within the last thirty days would be 
vulnerable and were more likely to perceive immigrants who operated small businesses as 
affecting their (the respondent’s) socio-economic well-being, which in turn would affect 
support for looting as a good thing.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that each category of independent variables incorporated into the 
final model, except for economic variables, impacts on the support for collective looting. The 
effect of the manipulations is unaffected by the introduction of other variables, including for 
example, demographic variables and subjective variables. Compared with the effect of the 
demographic variables, the impact of income variables appears small. Curiously, the 














By using support for looting as a measure of young adults’ attitudes towards immigrants, the 
researcher extracted pattern of judgements relatively similar to that of support for deportation 
presented in chapter three. Just as the analysis of the effect of varying an immigrant’s 
characteristics and nationality on the support for deportation, the situational context affects 
support for looting, albeit marginally. Respondents showed compassion, with very few 
respondents reporting that looting was either “Ok” or “Good”. The findings reported in 
chapter three and four suggest that the method that is used to assess attitudes towards 
immigrants affects the extent and nature of people’s attitudes. Policy interventions aimed at 
reducing negative attitudes towards immigrants may need to take into account the effect of 
manipulating an immigrant’s characteristics and circumstances on attitude formation. 
 
As noted in the discussion of the literature, negative attitudes towards immigrants are a 
complex socio-economic phenomenon that is moulded by economic, political and social 
factors. The results presented in this chapter, to a certain extent, support the argument that 
people who perceive immigrants as a threat to their socio-economic well-being are more 
likely to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants. Social position indicators 
such as gender, race correlated with support for looting. The effect of race, compared to the 
other social position variables, stresses the high levels of inequality and poverty in Cape 
Town (see Appendix 2). Poverty reduces people’s life chances, as illustrated in the analysis 
by the respondents’ – willingn ss to accept a low-status job. The results from the regression 
analysis show that the experience of violence adds much to the explanatory power of the 
model in statistical terms. Earlier studies have suggested that suggests that poverty enhance 
the likelihood of a person or group engaging in violence or becoming a victim of violence 
(Butchart and Emmett, 2000; Burns, 2008; Thaler, 2011). In sum, the results suggest that 
manipulating and immigrants characteristics and circumstances has an effect on attitudes 
towards immigrants, in particular the nationality of a trader operating a small business – in 













CHAPTER 5 PERCEPRTIONS ABOUT IMMIGRANTS IN 
FIVE NEIGHBOURHOODS IN CAPE TOWN 
This chapter is an analysis of experiences with, and perceptions of, immigrants among South 
Africans
21
 living in five neighbourhoods in Cape Town - Delft Leiden, Delft North, Delft 
South, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley
22
. The analysis presented in this chapter 
complements the findings made in the previous chapters; though the focus shifts to a 
qualitative study. Findings in the previous chapters suggest that there are few clear-cut 
characteristics, which correlate with specific attitudes towards immigrants; making it difficult 
to identify and label the factors that affect people’s perceptions about immigrants, with 
exactitude. In this chapter, the researcher presents findings in a unified argument. Locating 
what people say (the data) in their economic, political and social milieu. The researcher pays 
close attention to the ways in which the respondents expressed negative attitudes towards 
immigrants, and relates attitudes to the context in which the individual interviewees find 
themselves. 
5.1 Factors that Affect People’s Attitudes towards Immigrants  
This section unpacks the interviewees’ differentiated experiences with immigrants, by 
exploring their descriptions of their experiences and perceptions of immigrants against the 
background of their social milieu. Through the investigation of the lived experiences, the 
study begins to build a picture of the factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants. In this 
section, the researcher begins by introducing five respondents. In their stories, we see that 
various factors, such as relations across race, negative stereotypes and religion affect attitudes 
towards immigrants. 
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Sindiswa is a 35-year-old widow who lives in Weltevreden Valley with her three children. 
She grew up in the Eastern Cape and moved to Cape Town in 1997. When she first arrived in 
Cape Town, Sindiswa lived with her brother in Crossroads. She then moved to join her 
husband’s family in Philippi. Due to a family dispute involving her in-laws, Sindiswa and her 
husband moved into an informal settlement in Samora in 1998. Whilst living in Samora, 
Sindiswa registered on the housing waiting list, and waited for a year and a half before the 
housing authorities allocated her a house in Weltevreden Valley in 2000.  
 
In terms of material wealth, Sindiswa states that she is the same as people living in her 
community. Sindiswa does not regard herself as poor, because to her “a poor person is 
someone who does not have anything.” Like most people living in her neighbourhood, 
Sindiswa is unemployed but she receives child support grants
23
 for two of her youngest 
children. 
 
In addition, Sindiswa sells meat at home and leases a shack in her backyard in order to 
supplement her income: “[Zimbabweans] live at the back of my house, and they have lived 
with me for four years.” Sindiswa described her tenants as people who “do not have too many 
friends.” In the past, Sindiswa leased her backyard shack to other tenants. Describing her 
previous experience with South African tenants, Sindiswa uses common stereotypes that 
people of different cultures and race in South Africa have about each other: “Tshangane are 
rude, they are the same as coloureds. They fight and they want the whole world to see that 
they are fighting. On weekends, they drink the whole night and they make noise. I did not like 
them and I chased them out.” 
 
Curiously, Sindiswa’s perception on social integration reflected positive attitudes towards 
immigrants: “I like it when we are mixed. My tenants show me how they live in their country, 
and I show them how we do things.” Sindiswa is supportive of the rights of immigrants living 
in her community, and shows an appreciation for cross-border immigration: “Your job might 
transfer you to Mozambique, which is not your country. How do you think [Mozambicans] 
will react when you are there? Our people are there, so why should we say [immigrants] do 
not have rights?” 
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5.1.2 Dylan  
Dylan grew up in Parrow and moved to Delft Leiden in 2002 when the local government 
authorities allocated him a house there. Like most residents in Delft Leiden, Dylan had been 
on the waiting list for a house for a long time. He reflected on how difficult it was to acquire 
a house: “I was on a waiting list for a long time. My wife and I had done the application for 
the house in 1985 and since that time, we were waiting for the house.” 
 
Dylan lives with his wife and two children, and is a self-employed tailor. He does not have a 
steady income and receives between R1000 and R5000 per month, but he expressed 
satisfaction with his income and lifestyle. In addition, friendly neighbours who “are like 
family”, and whom he can trust with his children should he and his wife need a child minder, 
surround Dylan. These neighbours include immigrants who live in his street: “Up the street 
here there is one [immigrant] from Pakistan and we are very close to each other. The other 
one comes from Somalia and we are also very close to each other.” He explained just how 
close his relationship with his immigrant neighbours was: “The Somali people are doing 
business here, and my friend has got a barber shop. I usually go there on my way to work. He 
knows that every month I cut my hair by him, sometimes for free, as a friend, and that is 
because of our relationship.” Although they are not competing for the same resource, Dylan 
does not mention feeling resentment because his immigrant neighbours own businesses. 
 
Commenting on social integration in Delft Leiden, Dylan feels that people should 
“communicate more with each other.” In the immediate future, Dylan sees the success of 
social integration as depending on children: “Our children can make a difference because 
they are growing up communicating with people of different backgrounds.” Dylan is open-
minded about social integration, which he explains very eloquently: “My neighbours are 
people of different backgrounds. My next-door neighbour is coloured, my other next-door 
neighbour is black and the one next to him is white. The communication is very good, and we 
do not have a problem with each other.” Like Sindiswa, Dylan says that he does not 
discriminate against immigrants living in his community. Rather, he takes pride in the 













Ryan is 41 years old and lives with his wife and four children (aged twenty-one, nineteen, 
twelve and five), in Tambo Square. They have been married for twenty-two years. He met his 
wife whilst living in Manenberg, sharing a house with a friend. Unlike Dylan, Ryan only had 
to wait for nine months before the housing authorities allocated him a house. Since 1999, 
Ryan has been living in Tambo Village, and gets along well with his neighbours, who are 
predominantly coloured.  
 
Ryan works in a waterproofing company and receives R300 a day. However, his work is 
seasonal and greatly affected by rainy weather. This means that some weeks he is not able to 
work and therefore earns nothing. In addition to the income from Ryan’s job, the family 
receives monthly child support grants for their two younger children. Understandably, Ryan 
is dissatisfied with his income and he explains this when he says, “everything that we earn 
feeds us; we do not have enough to save.” 
 
Crime and violence are rife in Ryan’s neighbourhood, and this could be a consequence of 
poverty: “When we first moved here and people were shooting we would all lie on the 
ground. Now we are used [to it]. When they shoot, we all run to go and see because the fear 
has gone, the softness is gone.” The extent of violence in Ryan’s neighbourhood becomes 
clearer when he reflects on the events of May 2008, when violence against immigrants 
erupted there. He describes how he helped his immigrant neighbours to escape: “When 
[neighbourhood members] came over to kill the Somalis and set their shacks alight, I put all 
of them in the car and drove them to Bellville. I was the only person in this whole 
[neighbourhood] who helped.” His act of heroism, however, did make him unpopular with 
his South African neighbours: “When I got back, [neighbourhood members] wanted to 
assault me.” This indicates the range of responses to immigrants: some nationals want to 
attack immigrants, and even attack South African nationals who help immigrants; and other 
nationals are prepared to assist immigrants even at some risk to their selves.  
 
Since rescuing the Somalis from an unimaginable fate, Ryan feels that he is closer to his 
immigrant neighbours than before: “When [the Somalis] returned some of them came to 
shake my hands to thank me, they hugged me. That is why, when I go to their shop I spend 












as much right to stay in Tambo Square as South Africans do: “[Somalis] are human like we 
are, and they are God’s creation. Many people are against them coming in for work, they do 
not have it easy, in their country there is war.” Religion seems to affect the perceptions that 
Ryan holds about the rights bestowed to immigrants, which might explain why he was 
willing to risk his life in assisting immigrants to escape the violence of May 2008. 
5.1.4 Dumisa 
Dumisa grew up in the Eastern Cape, near King William’s Town, and in 1991 came to Cape 
Town to look for employment. Before moving to Delft Leiden in 2003, Dumisa stayed in Joe 
Slovo, a predominantly black township. Like Dylan, Dumisa waited for several (eight) years 
before the Cape Town Housing Department allocated him a house. At the time of the 
interview, Dumisa had recently lost his job and was living with his girlfriend, who operated a 
small business from his home. Their monthly income was less than R3000 per month. 
 
Sadly, Dumisa had a very strained relationship with his neighbours, whom he accused of 
being jealous and spreading rumours about him: “I have no relationship with my neighbours 
because they are jealous of me. My neighbours told my former girlfriend that I was in love 
with another girl around the area, and that the girl I was in love with was HIV positive. Even 
the girlfriend I am living with now, they say the same thing to her.” As a result, Dumisa had 
limited interaction with his neighbours: “We greet each other good morning and good 
afternoon, but we do nothing together.” An unstable relationship with other South Africans 
seems to have affected his interaction with immigrants living in his neighbourhood, some of 
whom are also his neighbours: “I cannot tell you about people who come from other 
countries because I do not know about them, I just know they are from Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe.” 
 
Dumisa mistrusts his neighbours, and feels that crime is rife in Delft Leiden. He illustrates 
this when he says, “I do not trust anyone, and there are many thieves here because we are a 
mixed [coloured and black] neighbourhood.” His view of coloureds is very unflattering: 
“Coloureds are very, very silly because they smoke drugs, they drink liquor, they are rude 
and they do unnecessary things.” As a result, Dumisa felt that most of the problems faced by 
Delft Leiden residents result from social integration. Dumisa holds very fond memories of his 
relationship with his neighbours in Joe Slovo: “Joe Slovo was a very tight [neighbourhood] 












Joe Slovo we were staying alone, blacks only.” Dumisa obviously does not trust coloureds, 
and alleges that during the May 2008 violence against immigrants, coloureds were 
responsible for chasing immigrants away from Delft: “[Coloureds] chased away the people 
who do business here from Ethiopia and Somalia. It was the coloured people, no black 
people supported that.” These statements speak of the subtle racial tension between racial 
groups in Delft Leiden.  
 
Although Dumisa feels that social integration has not been successful in Delft Leiden, he is 
adamant that true integration is achievable in post-apartheid South Africa. He says, “It is 
possible to live together, but we must understand that we are all equal now. If we can unite 
and build our community and secure our community as well I think it would be good for us.” 
This might be the reason why, despite having no interaction with immigrants in his 
community, Dumisa feels that immigrants have a right to live in Delft: “[Immigrants] do 
nothing wrong to us, so I do not know how I can say they have no right to stay with us.” 
Dumisa appreciates the contribution that immigrants make to the neighbourhood, without 
prejudice: “[Immigrants] come to help us. They open shops in our area, the shops that [South 
Africans] do not know how to open.” As such, Dumisa holds stronger negative attitudes 
towards coloureds, than he does immigrants. 
 
Dumisa’s negative experience with his neighbours has induced negative attitudes towards 
coloureds in general, and it is probable that Dumisa has a cultural affinity with immigrants 
living in his community, since his descriptions are about African immigrants. On the other 
hand, Dumisa may resent coloureds more because of their slightly superior status to that of 
black South Africans during apartheid. He may see himself as struggling for social equality 
with otherwise better off coloureds. Dumisa came from the Eastern Cape to Cape Town in 
search of better prospects, so it is reasonable to infer that he may feel like an immigrant in his 
native country. 
5.1.5 Dineo  
When Dineo was born, her family were renting a house in Gugulethu, Cape Town. However, 
her parents lost the house when her father was involved in an accident and could no longer 
pay the rent. Her family then moved to an informal settlement, and later moved to Tambo 
Square when the Housing Department allocated her parents a house. Dineo now lives with 












but sells medicines to cover her living expenses. When business is good, Dineo can earn up to 
R2000 per month in profit. In terms of material wellbeing, Dineo considers herself to be just 
about the same as others “because [she] eats before [she] sleeps every day.”  
 
Since moving to Tambo Square in 1997, Dineo finds that relations with her neighbours are 
more formal. She recalls days in the informal settlements, with nostalgia: “In the shacks, it 
was not like here. If I was short of beef stock, I could go to my neighbour. Here people stay in 
their houses; we just greet each other when we pass.” As a result, Dineo keeps to herself, 
because she “[does] not want to irritate” her neighbours. Concerning immigrants living in 
her neighbourhood, Dineo is very selective about who has or has not the right to stay there. 
She feels that immigrants increase the rate of crime in South Africa: “People from Zimbabwe 
are here because of the situation there. I understand why they came to live here, so I do not 
have a problem with them. There are those people from other countries who bring crime. I 
am not saying that there is no crime in South Africa, but they make it worse. So no, they do 
not have a right to belong here.” What is curious is the nature of the criminal activity that 
Dineo is concerned about: “I hate this thing they are doing of dubbing CD’s and making 
copies, that is what I hate the most.” However, Dineo is strongly against the use of violence 
against immigrants, and reflects on the events of May 2008 with regret: “When [immigrants] 
were beaten I did not like it. I wished they were given their things and given time to leave.” It 
appears Dineo is against the use of violence towards immigrants, but not against their 
deportation from South Africa. Her argument is that immigrants increase crime, and do not 
have the right to live in South Africa, unless they have a good reason to remain in the 
country. 
5.2 Discussion 
The previous section opened with the respondents’ experiences, and perceptions, about 
immigrants living in their neighbourhoods. Upon examining the respondent’s descriptions 
about immigrants, the researcher was able to show that the respondents’ relations and 
economic realities affect attitudes towards immigrants. The racially desegregated housing 
allocation in Delft Leiden, Delft North, Delft South, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley 
adds a curious and challenging dynamic to communal relations and attitudes towards 
immigrants: a population with various socio-economic and cultural cleavages, which are a 













The life histories of the respondents reflected severe material deprivation, as most 
respondents were unemployed and lived in impoverished circumstances: “I am not working 
and I cannot support myself and my children. We receive a child support grant for my 
grandson who is ten and it sustains us for the whole month” (Buthle, Delft South). 
 
Concerning jobs, some respondents felt that immigrants are responsible for the increase in the 
high levels of unemployment in their neighbourhood, because the latter take opportunities, to 
operate businesses and have a job, away from South Africans (Hypothesis 5). The 
respondents’ descriptions reflected feelings of exclusion and resentment: “The Somalis and 
the Zimbabweans are taking all the work, because they work for lower wages. That is why 
there are no jobs for South Africans” (Celeste, Delft South). This could lead to individual or 
collective violence against immigrants. The interviewees’ descriptions suggested that living 
in poverty and lacking employment strains relationships between immigrants and nationals, 
as people associated immigrants with stealing jobs, causing crime and bringing disease like 
HIV/AIDS to South Africa. 
 
Analysis in chapters three and four showed that poverty and unemployment have only 
indirect effect on attitudes towards immigrants. Unemployment was not significant as 
predictor of the support for deportation or looting. The relationship between labour market 
position, poverty and unemployment has not been explored widely in the South African 
context, though Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) have found that unemployment affects 
attitudes towards immigrants negatively. 
 
Due to the high level of material deprivation in these five neighbourhoods, interviewees 
stated that financial strain exacerbated negative attitudes towards immigrants (Hypothesis 7). 
Respondents perceived immigrants to be financially more successful, the evidence was the 
former’s ownership of material goods. The researcher found many descriptions of immigrants 
who operate successful businesses in the respondents’ narratives, Somali and Nigerian 
immigrants in particular: The Nigerians and Somalis are here to make money, small shops 
and barbershops. The Somalis cut the hair, the Nigerians have shops and they keep their 












protests: “There was a protest here because Nigerians and Somalis are selling their goods 
cheaper than coloureds” (Ayanda, Delft North). 
 
Whilst, some respondents, for example, Dylan and Dumisa, showed no resentment towards 
immigrants operating businesses in their neighbourhoods, for others, these neighbourhood 
businesses run by immigrants trigger negative attitudes towards, which are often associated 
with criminal activities: 
“There are Somalis and Nigerians staying here, and they are a problem. They sell everything 
at a very low cost, and the reason for that is because they are selling drugs and they are also 
selling fake things”(Anya, Delft North). 
“Somalis and Nigerians rob people. They have beautiful cars and money because they deal 
with diamonds and drugs” (Celeste, Delft South). 
 
The nationality of immigrants’ appears to have a strong effect on people’s perceptions that 
some immigrants are engaged in crime (Hypothesis 1). Reitzes and Bam (2000) support this 
finding. In the regression analysis, though, an immigrant’s nationality tended to have only 
indirect effect on attitudes towards immigrants. Yet immigrants from African countries were 
a major concern for the interviewees, which maybe because the majority of immigrants living 
these neighbourhoods (based on the interviewees’ descriptions) are from other African 
countries. Generally, the interviewees blamed immigrants for a variety of social ills, which 
afflict their neighbourhoods. Interviewees saw immigrants as agents of crime and social 
decay: 
“If your [mobile] phone is stolen [immigrants] are able to unlock it even if you block it. It is 
such criminal activities that I do not like. South Africans do not know what to do when a 
phone is blocked.” (Luzuko, Weltevreden Valley) 
 
The perception that immigrants spread diseases also affected attitude towards immigrants, 
and it is probable that the high rates of HIV/AIDS prevalence, in the South African, 
compound these perceptions. The results presented in chapter three showed that support for 
deportation was stronger for an undocumented immigrant who was unemployed and/or HIV 
positive. A similar trend was observed among interviewees who supported restrictive 












“[Immigrants] do not belong here. During apartheid, how was it? The apartheid government 
did not allow them access here. What will happen if I go to Somalia now, if I open a shop 
there? Will they like it? The other day I read in the newspaper about [an immigrant] working 
as security guard who is paid very little. The man said that he had left his wife and children 
in Somalia, or wherever. He came to make money here, but he does not even make enough 
money to take care of himself. What is the use, to come here and struggle, because he could 
have stayed and struggled there” (Deon, Delft North). 
 
Yet some respondents were compassionate, and acknowledged that immigrants alone cannot 
take the blame for all the social ills in this country: “Some people say that Somalis bring 
drugs and AIDS into the country that is bullshit, they are just jealous” (Ayanda, Delft North). 
In addition, respondents appeared to sympathise more with some groups of immigrants, 
particularly Zimbabwean immigrants, most of who have fled their country due to economic 
insecurity and political persecution – the findings in chapter three of this dissertation 
supported this conclusion: “Because of poverty and hardships from where [Zimbabweans] 
come from, I don’t judge them. I welcome them. It is terrible where they come from, poverty, 
no jobs, and all those things” (Sikhumbuzo, Tambo Square). 
 
Religion also seemed to play an important role in determining the respondents’ attitudes 
towards immigrants: “I do not have the right to say ‘[immigrants] do not belong here’ 
because they are a creation of God, the only difference is that they are from another place, 
but they are still God’s creation” (Rosalie, Delft South). It is probable that religious beliefs 
encourage a more tolerant attitude, and promote interaction in churches and mosques, though 
there are no studies that confirm this relationship. Social values shape the way people 
perceive others, such that attitudes towards immigrants are a product of socialisation. Thus, 
religious organisations can mould norms and values that individuals hold, as reflected in the 
respondents’ descriptions. Some researchers have argued that religious organisations offer a 
place for progressive theological reflection and practical action on moral formation and social 
justice (Deacon and Simbayi, 2006). 
 
On the other hand, immigrants also appeared to have adopted some strategies to integrate into 
the neighbourhood. Rosalie, who lived in Delft South, explained how immigrants learnt the 












nationals in order legitimise their stay in South Africa: “[Immigrants] get married to South 
Africans to get a visa and citizenship, and learn how to communicate with us.” 
 
Overall, the interviewees’ descriptions, which were analysed in this chapter, suggest that in 
attitudes towards immigrants in the five neighbourhoods considered were generally negative. 
The respondents’ relationships and economic realities affected the formation of their attitudes 
towards immigrants. The negative attitudes were no illusion as the overwhelmingly negative 
discourses about immigrants show. The respondents perceive immigrants as a group to be 














CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
This study has analysed attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town, South Africa, using a 
two-pronged approach. This study originated from a concern about the widespread negative 
attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa. Using survey data, first of all, the researcher 
assessed the effect of manipulating an immigrant’s characteristics and circumstances, on 
attitudes towards immigrants among young adults in Cape Town. The quantitative analysis 
revealed that varying an immigrant’s characteristics and circumstances, does affect attitudes 
towards immigrants, although sometimes in unexpected ways. Secondly, the researcher 
examined the lived experiences and perceptions of immigrants among homeowners who were 
living in five – newly-built, low-income neighbourhoods – in Cape Town. 
 
In chapter two the researcher reviewed local studies that have documented the negative 
attitudes towards immigrants, in South Africa and elsewhere. Evidence that negative public 
attitudes in South Africa have increased can be found in attitude surveys and local case 
studies. Factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants are complex and interconnected, to 
such an extent that it was difficult to construct a framework for assessing attitudes towards 
immigrants for this study. The researcher then considered attitude studies conducted in the 
West (USA and Europe) in order to formulate hypotheses that were testable using data from 
the CAPS 2009. Hernes and Knudsen (1992) provided a useful framework for identifying the 
factors that affect attitude formation. They identified structural factors that provide the 
context within which group or individual attitudes are formed. Within this overall context, 
Hernes and Knudsen identified a number of socio-economic and demographic attributes that 
influence individual and group attitudes towards immigrants. Drawing on these factors and 
evidence from previous studies, the researcher formulated nine hypotheses, which related 
mainly to economic and cultural threat theoretical models. 
 
In chapter three the researcher examined vignette data on young adults’ support for the 
deportation of immigrants from South Africa. The analysis considered two vignettes – short 
stories about immigrants – that varied the characteristics and circumstances of individual 
immigrants living in South Africa. Analysis of the first vignette - about an undocumented 
immigrant from Zimbabwe – showed that attitudes towards immigrants, gauged by support 












respondents (35 percent) supporting deportation. Young adults expressed negative attitudes 
towards an unemployed (40 percent) and HIV positive (38 percent) immigrant, but showed 
compassion for an immigrant threatened with persecution (29 percent) or whose family was 
starving in the home country (32 percent). The effects of the manipulations were small, and 
provided little evidence that young adults were making distinctions between a desirable or 
undesirable immigrant based on the immigrant’s circumstances. This could be a consequence 
of an immigrant’s legal status. At a theoretical level, these findings suggest that, consistent 
with the work of several other researchers (e.g. Crush et al., 2008; Everatt, 2010), there are 
boundary conditions for successfully improving less restrictive policy measures against 
immigrants. When an immigrant is described as undocumented, as is the case for the 
undocumented immigrant vignette, support for deportation may actually rise regardless of the 
immigrant’s circumstances.  
The second vignette, about an immigrant family in South Africa, was more successful in 
generating intolerance. Young adults expressed a distinct preference for immigrants who 
work and pay their taxes, with only a minority (12 percent) supporting the deportation of an 
immigrants family who work and get along with their neighbours. Manipulating the 
immigrant family’s nationality did not matter at all. In this regard, economic factors, rather 
than cultural factors, appear to make a significant difference in the young adults’ support for 
deportation. In terms of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, the findings did not 
support the view that national identity can have a significant impact on the support for 
deportation. This is promising because changing people’s conceptions of national identity is a 
difficult task (Esses et al., 2006).  Immigrants perceived to be a fiscal burden, as they did not 
contribute to the country at all, were more likely to elicit support for their deportation 
(Hypothesis 7). The effect of the individual characteristics of respondents (on whether they 
supported the deportation option or not) were inconsistent. Both economic – class, education 
(Hypothesis 6), employment (Hypothesis 5) – and cultural – age (Hypothesis 4), gender 
(Hypothesis 3), race (Hypothesis 2) – variables explained small variations in the respondents’ 
support for deportation, and there were no clearly definable traits common to those who 
exhibited stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants. Subjective variables (which related 
to the respondents’ social milieu (Hypotheses 8 and 9)) were a little more successful in 














Chapter 4 presented quantitative data, but shifted the focus to assessing attitudes towards 
immigrants based on the morality of looting. It again provided the opportunity to manipulate 
the trader’s nationality and the circumstances for looting. Support for looting was very low; 
the majority of respondents (93 percent) reported that looting was either “Very bad” or 
“Bad”. Manipulating the nationality of the trader affected support for deportation (Hypothesis 
1). In this instance, a Somali immigrant who was described as more successful, in terms of 
material wealth and within a township setting, triggered negative attitudes among some 
groups of respondents. Varying the reason for looting had no effect on the support for 
looting. The nationality of the immigrant (cultural threat), mattered more than the 
circumstances given for looting (economic threat), which contrasts with the findings in 
chapter three in which the nationality of the immigrant family did not matter, compared to the 
social status of the immigrant family. It is probable that the nationality variable represented 
by a Somali trader, which was manipulated in the looting vignette, was interpreted as an 
economic threat (Hypothesis 7) by the respondents who supported looting, as it is common 
for Somali traders to operate businesses in South African townships. Immigrants who operate 
businesses in the townships are perceived more successful than locals, in terms of material 
wealth, but it is also the case that they make opportunities for employing South Africans.  
 
Among those who supported looting, regarding a respondent’s individual characteristics, it 
seems that those respondents, who are more likely to have direct contact with Somali traders 
in the townships, supported looting. Demographic factors that were associated with support 
for looting, include race (blacks were more likely to support looting, compared to coloured 
and white respondents – Hypothesis 2); and gender (female respondents were more likely to 
support looting than male respondents – Hypothesis 3). The effect of gender is difficult to 
explain, but the townships are predominantly poor black urban neighbourhoods, and many 
case studies have found evidence of competition for scarce resource between immigrants and 
nationals (Dobson and Oelofse, 2000; Pillay et al., 2008). Economic factors (Hypotheses 5 
and 6) had an indirect effect on the support for looting, compared to subjective variables. 
Whilst economic variables increased the explanatory power of the multivariate regression 
model by two percent, subjective variables increased the model’s explanatory power by 
approximately 12 percent. More research is needed to better establish the presence or absence 
of interactions between economic variables and immigrant characteristics that affect support 












marked effect on support for looting. This stresses the relationship between poverty and 
violence, common in black urban townships, which may exacerbate hostile attitudes towards 
immigrants. In summary, chapters three and four indicated the effects of manipulating an 
immigrant’s characteristics and circumstances produced more positive and differentiated 
attitudes. 
 
The researcher was also interested in capturing people’s perceptions of their experiences of 
immigrants living in their neighbourhoods, as opposed to presenting people with stories about 
immigrants. Data presented in chapter five showed that homeowners who participated in a 
neighbourhood study, exhibited negative attitudes towards immigrants. Competition for 
material resources affected attitudes towards immigrants. This finding resonated with the 
conclusions in chapter four. The most common explanation for these negative attitudes was a 
sense that immigrants exacerbate unemployment (Hypothesis 5) because they are seen to be 
taking business opportunities away from South African nationals. The results also showed 
that immigrants were accused of a variety of social ills which were rampant in these five 
neighbourhoods. Most notable was the perception that immigrants were involved in criminal 
activities. Immigrants from Nigeria and Somalia were particularly liable to be stereotyped as 
criminals, who traded in diamonds and drugs, or who laundered money. These stereotypes 
were often linked to their relative wealth in contrast to the severe material deprivation in 
these neighbourhoods. This contrast came out strongly in respondents’ descriptions. As a 
result, interviewees supported restrictive immigration policies and felt that immigrants had no 
right to live in their neighbourhoods. Yet not all interviewees were intolerant of immigrants. 
As in the quantitative analysis, respondents also showed compassion towards some groups of 
immigrants, Zimbabwean immigrants in particular. Religion appeared to play an important 
role in mediating people’s attitudes towards immigrants. 
 
Finally then, this study suggests that vignettes offer an alternative method of exploring 
attitudes towards immigrants. The effects of manipulating an immigrant’s characteristics and 
circumstances suggest that attitudes towards immigrants among young adults in Cape Town 
are generally negative, but not monolithically so. The immigration policy in South Africa 
needs to be revisited and young adults in South Africa need to be educated around issues of 
immigration. Given the relative importance of the situational contexts manipulated in the 












In this way, we may be able to more clearly pinpoint whether the vignette technique is a 
means of producing more valid and more reliable measures of respondents’ opinions on 
immigrants and immigration issues. Further research, using this method in studying attitudes 
towards immigrants, could also benefit from a more holistic ethnographic approach, in order 
to gain an expanded and more nuanced understanding of the factors that affect attitudes 
towards immigrants in South Africa. Of course, relations between immigrants and non-
immigrants are not one-sided. Just as it is important to determine how citizens of a nation 
respond to immigration issues, it is important to examine how these issues influence 
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Appendix 1: Study methods 
In this section, the researcher provides an overview of the study methods. 
 
The Study Site 
Cape Town (the largest city in the Western Cape Province) is a multi-cultural city. 
Pronounced socio-economic inequalities and residential segregation along racial lines 
characterise the geography of the city. Unlike other South African cities, coloureds comprise 
the majority of the population, this group makes up 48 percent of Cape Town’s population, 
which is estimated at three million
24
 (City of Cape Town, 2001). Under apartheid, Cape 
Town was a coloured labour preference area (Saff, 1998). The government of that time 
deliberately separated black residents from their white counterparts. There were strict laws to 
prevent the mass urbanisation of black South Africans. This has given Cape Town a 
distinctive racial composition and cultural character (Seekings et al., 2005; Seekings, 2007a; 
2007b). 
 
Cape Town grapples with many of the socio-economic problems confronting the rest of 
South Africa, the most crucial of which are unemployment and housing shortages. According 
to Seekings (2007b, 2007c), the poverty and inequality in Cape Town is a legacy of South 
Africa’s apartheid past, which discriminated against black South Africans. Racial residential 
segregation, unemployment and an unequal distribution of labour are still characteristic of 
contemporary Cape Town more than a decade after the transition to democracy. 
 
In Cape Town, poverty coexists with great affluence (ibid). Many black South Africans in 
Cape Town are extremely poor, with the majority living in townships and informal 
settlements, which are characterised by great poverty and social deprivation. Many black 
South Africans had high expectations that political change would reduce poverty and 
inequality (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). 
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 It is noted that the figures presented here are based on the 2001 Census and do not accurately reflect the 












Most townships in Cape Town are at a considerable distance from the central business district 
and the affluent suburbs. Under apartheid, black South Africans were disposed of valuable 
land because of forced removals. The townships were dormitory areas for black workers 
employed in white businesses and homes. Underdeveloped and remote rural areas in the 
Eastern Cape, called homelands, were the preserve of black South Africans. With the 
establishment of democratic government, black South Africans migrated into formerly white 
cities (Gilbert et al., 1997; Saff, 1998). Inequality and poverty in Cape Town persist, in part, 
because of the large-scale migration of poor black South Africans from the Eastern Cape. 
Rural to urban migration has reinforced urban inequality and poverty because of the high 
level of unemployment. This has also resulted in increased pressure on social services, and in 
rampant crime. 
 
According to Saff (1998:90), competition for housing, jobs and land has increased racial 
tensions between blacks and coloureds. Many coloureds in Cape Town argue that post-
apartheid government policies favour blacks over coloureds. Cape Town, however, presents 
an enabling and favourable environment – particularly in terms of relative tolerance towards 
immigrants – and attracts a large number of immigrants from neighbouring African countries. 
Many immigrants come to Cape Town with little or no economic resources; they have fled 
from conflict or are searching for a better life. Because of their limited financial resources, 
many immigrants reside in predominantly black townships and informal settlements, where 
conditions are appalling. Despite South Africa’s relative wealth compared to the rest of 
Africa, and its superior economic position in the region, the country grapples with 
unemployment, and the government services directed at meeting the needs of the poor are 
very under resourced and poorly administered. Because of the huge burden of unmet basic 
human needs of the majority of South Africans, these circumstances can easily lead to 
conflict between South Africans and immigrants. 
 
The Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) 
The quantitative data used in this study comes from the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel 
Study (CAPS 2009 hereafter), which was conducted by the Centre for Social Science 
Research (CSSR hereafter) at the University of Cape Town. The CAPS 2009 comprises a 
representative sample of young adults aged between 19 and 35 years. The unweighted sample 













CAPS, which began in 2002, and was continued in 2003/2004, 2005, 2006 and 2009, is a 
longitudinal survey of young adults living in Cape Town. It focused on a series of economic, 
political and social attitudes. The first wave of the CAPS, conducted in 2002, had an original 
sample of 4,752 young adults, whose ages ranged from 14 to 22 years
25
. Significantly, the 
CAPS began eight years after South Africa’s first democratic election. Although young adults 
in post-apartheid South Africa have more opportunities than previously for access to housing, 
education, employment, health and welfare the country grapples with unemployment, crime, 
violence and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. By studying the challenges and opportunities that 
these young adults have to meet, the CAPS makes it possible for researchers and policy 
makers to explore the complicated transition that faces young people in Cape Town. 
 
Data Collection 
The original CAPS used a stratified two-stage sampling design, which included young adults 
from each of the three major population groups (black, coloured and white) in Cape Town. 
The selection of the sample was random. Selection involved a complex process of dividing 
the 1996 population census into three strata depending on whether the population in each 
enumerating area (EA henceforth) was predominantly black, coloured or white
26
. The 
proportions of representatives drawn from the different racial groups meant that the sample 
was both purposive and representative. 
 
The first stage of sampling involved selecting sample clusters or primary sampling units 
(PSUs henceforth) using the EAs as the basic sampling units. The second stage of sampling 
involved selecting households within each cluster. The process of selecting 25 households 
from within the PSUs was done using aerial photographs combined with onsite inspection. 
The final sample of households interviewed included all screened households with members 
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 For a full description of the CAPS survey design and survey instrument visit http://www.caps.uct.ac.za/. 
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 An enumerating area (EA) is the geographical area enumerated by one census representative. 
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 In cases where a household had more than three young people, fieldworkers interviewed the three young 












In 2009, the fifth wave of the CAPS re-interviewed 2,915 of the respondents selected in wave 
one, who were re-interviewed in the second, third and forth waves. Three of the official 
languages spoken in South Africa, Afrikaans, English and Xhosa, were use to administer the 
questionnaire. The starting target for the CAPS 2009 was 4,100 respondents. Due to attrition 
(respondents moving away, death or mental illness), however, the realised sample was 2,915 
respondents. An important feature of the CAPS 2009 is that it included a new module that 
used vignettes to investigate attitudes towards immigrants, which provided data relevant for 
this study. 
 
Key Demographic Indicators 
This section briefly discusses the key demographic indicators of the CAPS 2009 using 
weighted data. The CAPS 2009 sample included interviews with 1,326 blacks, 1,425 
coloureds and 164 white respondents
28
. Almost half of the sample were coloured (49 
percent), and less than ten percent were white. Slightly more women participated in the 
survey compared to men. Approximately two fifths of the respondents were unemployed, and 
the income profile of the respondents suggested that a significant proportion of the 
respondents were poor. 
 
Table 10: CAPS 2000 Sample Characteristics  
 Percentages29 
Attribute Black Coloured White All respondents 
Gender      
 Female 54 51 48 51 
Age     
 18-26 69 71 81 72 
 27-35 31 29 19 28 
Language     
 Afrikaans 0 68 42 44 
 English 1 32 58 28 
 Xhosa 99 0 0 28 
Education     
 Primary 7 10 0 7 
 Secondary 89 85 68 83 
 Tertiary 4 6 32 10 
Employment status     
 Unemployed 56 37 39 41 
Income      
 R101-R600 3 1 0 1 
 R601-R1750 37 15 10 19 
  R1751-R5000 54 66 46 60 
 R5001-R1400 6 18 36 18 
 R14001+ 0 0 9 1 
Source: CAPS 2009 
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 Whites include Indians who made up less than 1 percent of the total population. 
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The researcher describes the specific statistical techniques used for analysing the survey data 
in the relevant chapters. 
 
Delft, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley Neighbourhood Work
30
 
The CSSR originally conducted the neighbourhood study in five housing projects, Delft 
Leiden, Delft North, Delft South, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley, in order to assess 
whether allocating houses to South Africans who are diverse, racially or in other terms, lead 
to identifiable economic, political or social problems. However, the interviews revealed 
attitudes towards immigrants, which provided data relevant for this research. 
 
Data Collection 
The Delft, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley Study employed a combination of multi-
stage cluster and purposive sampling in the selection of the samples. The researchers used 
purposive sampling because it is ideal for qualitative studies of specific neighbourhoods. The 
samples were based on the researchers’ knowledge of the population and the aims of the 
study (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). At the first stage of sampling, project researchers grouped 
the research site into large clusters. The second stage involved selecting sub-clusters within 
the large clusters in accordance with the number of interviews required. These sub-clusters 
existed as a number of houses bound by roads within the large cluster. The final stage of 
sampling involved purposively selecting houses within each sub-cluster, and then 
interviewing the homeowner about the quality of the neighbourhood. 
 
Interviews were semi-structured to provide in-depth information about the nature of the 
respondents’ experiences, and to allow the interviewees to speak freely so they could add 
more texture and depth: the interview schedule was only a guide. A team of the project 
researchers and a fieldworker conducted, recorded and transcribed all interviews (verbatim). 
They interviewed the head of each household. Depending on the interviewee’s language 
preference, interviews were conducted in Afrikaans, English or Xhosa. Afrikaans and Xhosa 
interviews were later translated into English.  
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 For a full description of the Delft, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley neighbourhood study see Seekings 













Table 11: Neighbourhood Study Sample Characteristics  





Anya Coloured 47 Female Married Unemployed Delft North 
Ayanda Coloured 40 Female Married Unemployed Delft North 
Buthle Black - Female Widow Unemployed Delft South 
Celeste Coloured - Female Single Unemployed Delft South 
Deon Coloured 45 Male Married Employed  Delft North 
Dineo Black 36 Female Single Unemployed Tambo Square 
Dumisa Black - Male Partner Unemployed Delft Leiden 
Dylan Coloured - Male  Married Self-employed Delft Leiden 




Rosalie Coloured  39 Female Married Unemployed Delft South 
Ryan Coloured  41 Male Married Employed Tambo Square 
Sindiswa Black  35 Female Widow Unemployed Weltevreden 
Valley 
Sisipho Black 49 Female - Unemployed Tambo Square 
 
Demographically the interviewees were broadly similar. The intention was not to make 
generalisations from their homogeneity, but to explore similarities and differences in their 
responses. There were both female and male interviewees, and they were either black or 
coloured. Most interviewees owned their houses. Almost all interviewees were unemployed 
and dependent on government grants (child welfare grants, disability grants and old age 
pensions) in order to support themselves and their families. Employed interviewees had 
unstable jobs, doing menial work. 
 
The Delft, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley neighbourhood study employed two core 
questions to examine attitudes towards immigrants: 
1. Do people from other countries live in this community? 
2. Tell me about other people from other countries who live in this community and how you 
get along with them? 
The first question served as a general orientating question to the discussion about the 
interviewees’ attitudes towards, and perceptions of, immigrants in their neighbourhood. The 
interviewees’ responses revealed both differences and similarities, and it immediately became 
clear that attitudes towards immigrants result from different experiences, which are neither 
static nor simple. 
 
Data Analysis 
To analyse the qualitative data, the researcher chose Miles and Huberman’s (1994) method of 













The first analytical step was to read the transcripts in order to become acquainted with the 
data and to get an initial feel of issues arising from the data, de Wet and Erasmus (2005) 
outlined this process. The second step involved coding the data. Miles and Huberman 
(1994:56) define coding as the “process of assigning units of meaning to the text passages 
that contain references to particular categories of data”. For the analysis, the researcher used 
Miles and Huberman’s first level coding, “a process of naming and classifying data, to 
produce working categories” (Fielding and Lee 1998:41). The next stage of the analysis 
involved using Miles and Huberman’s second level coding to identify regularities in the data 
(ibid, 1998:42). 
 
Limitations of the Study 
The study, by its very nature, is specific to Cape Town and the researcher cannot draw 
conclusions about the factors that influence attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa as a 
whole. The study provides an alternative and innovative research technique to understanding 
the factors associated with South Africans’ attitudes towards immigrants. Since the study 
draws on a cross-sectional data the study, in itself, does not provide insight into how attitudes 
towards immigrants have evolved. The results presented in this study bring out some salient 
features of the extent and nature of attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town. 
 
The understanding of the factors that affected attitudes towards immigrants is limited to those 
aspects probed by the particular research questions. For example, the CAPS 2009 survey does 
not address the multidimensional nature of factors that affect the formation of attitudes 
towards immigrants, because it is a large study on a variety of topics. This was particularly 
problematic and presented a challenge when analysing the data, because the researcher was 
obliged to adapt questions in ways that were not always optimal for her specific research 
interests: apart from the vignettes used to explore attitudes towards immigrants, the CAPS 
2009 did not contain any specific issues relating to immigrants or immigration policy. 
 
With regard to the qualitative data, the researcher acknowledges that the sample for the Delft, 
Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley study is not a representative sample. The study 
















In all studies, measures were taken to ensure that no harm occurred to any of the respondents. 
The consent of the respondents was sought before each interview, and respondents were 
required to fill in consent forms before they could take part in the studies. The respondents 
were assured that their identity would be kept confidential, and the data analysis maintained 
strict confidentiality. 
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 Research conducted by the CSSR operates under the approval of Human Subjects Review Board at the 
University of Cape Town. All CSSR project staff and fieldworkers involved in the projects received training in 












Appendix 2: Concerning Employment (CAPS 2009) 
Young adults who participated in the CAPS 2009 highlighted significant levels of inequality 
in Cape Town, in relation to some economic indicators. As a subjective measure of income 
and poverty, the survey asked respondents how they would classify their household’s overall 
financial situation. The differences across population groups were huge. While 36 percent of 
black respondents classified their overall household financial situation as “very poor” or 
“poor”, it is true of three percent of coloured respondents. No white respondents classified 
their overall household financial situation as “very poor” or “poor”, the majority (92 percent) 
classified their overall household financial situation as “very comfortable” or “comfortable”. 
Self-perceived household financial classification was consistent with individual income, as 
40 percent of black respondents reported a total monthly income of R1750 or less, compared 
to sixteen percent of coloured respondents and ten percent of white respondents. An indicator 
documenting the number of days a household went without enough to eat in the last 30 days 
reflected just what these economic class differences mean. Whilst 42 percent of black 
respondents reported that their household had not had enough to eat in the last 30 days, this is 
true of six percent of coloured respondents. No white respondents reported not having enough 
to eat (see Figure 1). 
 
Class differences, as judged by the researcher, reflect employment status. Employment status 
among the CAPS 2009 respondents reflected the catastrophic levels of unemployment 
afflicting young adults in Cape Town, with a massive 41 percent of the respondents reporting 
that they were unemployed. Whereas 56 percent of black respondents reported that they were 
unemployed, 37 percent of coloured respondents and 28 percent of white respondents were in 
a similar position. When the researcher considered unemployment by age group, 44 percent 
of the 18-26 year old grouping said they were unemployed, compared to 32 percent of the 27-
35 year old grouping. It is probable that a sizable proportion of young adults in the 18-26 year 
old grouping was still studying, and was doing so because they could not find employment. 
The crucial question is whether these young adults would be able to find employment once 
they completed their studies. Employment status also had an important gender dimension, as 
more women (43 percent) than men (38 percent) indicated that they were unemployed (see 
Figure 2). It is also probable, that a proportion of the women designated as unemployed, had 






























Source: Cape Area Panel Study 2009
in the last 30 days
Number of days a household did not have enough to eat
None 1-5 days
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Source: Cape Area Panel Study 2009
Employment status by gender and population group
 













An analysis of the reasons why unemployed young adults were not looking for work shows 
that lack of employment opportunities was the main reason given by the respondents. Other 
reasons for not looking for work were the expense related to the employment search, or that 
the respondent was studying; care giving was an important reason among female respondents. 
A question that asked respondents what they thought was the most important problem facing 
the country that the government should address, confirmed that unemployment was a 
problem among respondents. Job creation and unemployment ranked highest (50 percent) as 
the most important problem, followed by crime (27 percent), housing (7 percent) and poverty 
(7 percent). There are counter perceptions that black South Africans are unwilling to 
undertake unskilled employment, or that they are primarily concerned about how much they 
earn (Reitzes and Bam, 2000; Misago et al., 2010). The survey asked respondents if they 
would accept a low-status job that paid less than R3000 per month, and a significant finding 
is that 80 percent of black respondents reported that they would, compared to 45 percent of 
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Source: Cape Area Panel Study 2009
Accept a low-status job by gender and population group
 













Appendix 3: Concerning Housing, Sanitation and Water (CAPS 2009) 
Housing distribution among the CAPS 2009 sample reflected socio-economic differences. A 
substantial proportion (13 percent) of young adults in Cape Town lived in an informal 
dwelling, and four percent of the informal dwellings were backyard structures. The 
percentage of black respondents living in an informal dwelling, however, differed 
dramatically compared to that of coloured or white respondents. While a third of black 
respondents (30 percent) reported that they lived in an informal dwelling, this was true for 
two percent of coloured respondents. No white respondents reported living in an informal 
dwelling.  
 
Table 12: Housing Distribution 
 Percent 
Housing type Black Coloured White All 
respondents 
House or brick structure on separate stand or 
yard 
55 67 79 66 
Flat in block of flats 10 10 10 10 
Town/cluster/semi-detached house (simplex, 
duplex or triplex) 
1 18 9 12 
Brick house/flat/room in backyard (including 
converted garages etc) 
3 2 1 2 
Informal dwelling/shack, in backyard 9 2 0 4 
Informal dwelling/shack, NOT in backyard, 
e.g. in an informal settlement 
21 0 0 9 
Room/flatlet not in backyard, but on shared 
property 
0 0 0 0 
Room inside house (i.e. rented from owner of 
the house) 
0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 
Total  100 100 100 100 
Source: CAPS 2009 
 
All households had access to water, and the majority of households (84 percent) accessed 
water from an inside tap. Of the respondents living in an informal dwelling, thirteen percent 
reported that they had access to water from an inside tap, and the most common water 
sources for these respondents was water from a yard tap (43 percent) or a free public tap (40 
percent). On the other hand, five respondents reported that their household did not have a 
toilet; these respondents also lived in an informal dwelling. The majority of respondents (82 
percent), however, had a flush toilet inside the dwelling. Of the 2,071 respondents who 














Appendix 4: Concerning Crime and Violence (CAPS 2009) 
The CAPS 2009 highlights poverty and unemployment in Cape Town as endemic. Violence 
in Cape Town reflects deepening inequality, marginalisation of the youth, poverty, social 
disorganisation and social tensions, as well as high levels of unemployment. On the list of 
problems facing the country that the government should address, respondents ranked crime 
second. Most respondents attributed the increase in violence in the country to unemployment 
and poverty, a lack of respect for the law and alcohol consumption (see Table 13). Contrary 
to expectations, just over half of the respondents identified ineffective courts and police as 
the reason for increased violence in South Africa. It is significant that unemployment and 
poverty were not the only factors in people’s explanations of the rise of violence in the 
country. This implies that in order to tackle the problem of crime there is need to restore a 
sense of morality, social responsibility and a culture of respect for others and authority. 
Furthermore, employment creation has to be prioritised, as well as the socialisation of young 
adults to respect and obey authority, and to exercise greater tolerance and more respect for 
the human rights of others. 
 
Table 13: Views about violence by population group 
There is so much violence because... Percent who said “Strongly agree” or “Agree” 
   Black Coloured White Total 
Of unemployment and poverty. 90 88 79 87 
Young people do not learn about respect and 
discipline in the home or at school. 
75 82 68 77 
Men drink too much alcohol. 73 75 43 69 
The police and courts are ineffective. 51 63 39 55 
Source: CAPS 2009 
 
The distribution of respondents who reported that they knew someone who had committed a 
crime in their neighbourhood was disproportionate by population group (see Table 14). 
Coloured respondents were more likely than black or white respondents to know someone 
who sold drugs, stole from other people or had been to jail. In his documentary on gangs, 
Ross Kemp found that there was a strong culture of crime and violence among coloured 
communities in Cape Town, and this was due to inequality and poverty. The documentary 
referred to the infamous Numbers Gang, which operates on the Cape Flats in the coloured 
neighbourhoods. Thus, young coloured adults, in Cape Town, are more likely to experience 
or become victims of crime and violence than their black or white counterparts. Males are 













Table 14: Awareness of crime and violence by population group 
Do you know people who live in your 
neighbourhood who... 
Percent who said “Yes” 
   Black Coloured White Total 
Sell or deal in drugs? 27 65 6 44 
Steal from other people? 39 64 6 46 
Is or has been to jail? 44 66 10 49 
Source: CAPS 2009 
 
Curiously, very few respondents had been victims of crime in the last three years (see Table 
15). Slightly more black respondents reported that they had been victims of assault, robbery 
or burglary, compared to coloured or white respondents. 
 
Table 15: Experiences of crime by population group 
In the past three years, have you ever been a victim 
of... 
Percent who said “Yes” 
   Black  Coloured White Total 
Physical assault? 13 8 4 8 
Armed robbery? 14 8 5 9 
Burglary at home? 10 5 9 7 
Source: CAPS 2009 
 
Very few respondents also reported that they had concealed a weapon or physically assaulted 
another person in the last three years (see Table 16).  
 
Table 16: Perpetrators of crime by gender 
In the past three years have you ever... Percent who said “Yes” 
    Male Female  Total 
Carried a concealed knife or gun, outside your home? 13 2 8 
Hit or physically assaulted a girlfriend/boyfriend/partner or any adult 
in your family? 
10 8 9 
Hit or physically assaulted a friend or neighbour? 12 6 9 
Hit or physically assaulted a stranger or someone you do not know 
well? 
12 4 8 













Appendix 5: Concerning Undocumented Immigrants (CAPS 2009) 
In the CAPS 2009, respondents were asked to report how they felt about undocumented 
immigrants using a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means “Dislike them very much” and 10 means 
“Like them very much”. Overall, young adults in Cape Town averaged 4.75 for dislike of 
undocumented immigrants, and the standard deviation of responses was 3.56. Treating dislike 
as a continuous variable, the researcher inferred that moving up a “step” (for example from 
dislike level 0 to dislike level 1) corresponds to approximately a 10 percent decrease in 
dislike of undocumented immigrants, given that the scale has ten steps. An analysis of the 
mean dislike level for each population group suggests that, on average, black respondents 
have the highest level of dislike for undocumented immigrants, followed by coloured 
respondents. The least intolerant were white respondents. When the researcher considered 
dislike by gender, women, on average, had a higher level of dislike compared to men. Figure 
four shows the results when the researcher considered dislike across gender and population 
group. Clearly, the respondent’s gender related with reported dislike more than the 
respondent’s population group. The graph suggests that differences in levels of dislike 
between population groups vary when categorised by gender. The most significant difference 
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Source: Cape Area Panel Study 2009
by gender and population group
Mean stigma
 













Appendix 6: Summary statistics (Undocumented Immigrant)
32
 
“Should this person be deported back to Zimbabwe” 
     Percent  





Gender      
 Female 34 28 35 3 100 
 Male 35 26 34 5 100 
Race       
 Black 37 27 31 6 100 
 Coloured 36 28 33 3 100 
 White 28 26 44 2 100 
Age group      
 18-26 yrs 35 26 36 3 100 
 27-35 yrs 34 31 31 4 100 
Language      
 Afrikaans 37 26 35 3 100 
 English 29 30 37 3 100 
 Xhosa 36 27 32 6 100 
Education      
 Primary 42 26 29 3 100 
 Secondary 35 27 34 4 100 
 Tertiary 26 26 47 1 100 
Employment      
 Employed  33 28 35 4 100 
 Unemployed 37 27 33 4 100 
Income      
 R101-R600 50 27 16 7 100 
 R601_R1750 41 25 30 3 100 
 R1751-R5000 34 28 34 3 100 
 R5001-R14000 25 29 42 4 100 
 R14000+ 20 24 56 0 100 
Class      
 Upper class 33 28 36 3 100 
 Middle class 36 29 33 3 100 
 Working class 38 22 34 7 100 
Source: CAPS 2009 
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 “Selected” independent variables are key demographic variable. 
33












Appendix 7: Summary Statistics (Immigrant Family)
34
 
“Should this family be told to leave South Africa?” 
     Percent  





Gender      
 Female 40 22 37 1 100 
 Male  37 20 39 4 100 
Race       
 Black 32 23 39 6 100 
 Coloured 42 21 35 2 100 
 White 39 18 43 0 100 
Age group      
 18-26 yrs 38 20 39 2 100 
 27-35 yrs 39 24 34 3 100 
Language      
 Afrikaans 44 20 34 2 100 
 English 38 20 42 0 100 
 Xhosa 31 24 39 6 100 
Education      
 Primary 44 23 30 2 100 
 Secondary 38 22 37 3 100 
 Tertiary 39 13 48 0 100 
Employment      
 Employed  38 21 39 2 100 
 Unemployed 40 21 36 3 100 
Income      
 R101-R600 25 17 53 4 100 
 R601_R1750 38 22 37 4 100 
 R1751-R5000 39 22 37 2 100 
 R5001-R14000 33 23 43 1 100 
 R14000+ 16 9 75 0 100 
Class      
 Upper class 40 21 37 1 100 
 Middle class 39 22 37 3 100 
 Working class 32 20 42 6 100 
Source: CAPS 2009 
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 “Selected” independent variables are key demographic variables.  
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Appendix 8: Bivariate Regressions (Undocumented Immigrant) 
Indicator36 dx/dx Std. Err P|z| Psuedo r-
squared37 
95% CI 
Manipulations      
Unemployed (base = employed) 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.06, 0.16 
HIV positive (base = not specified) 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03, 0.11 
Family starving base = not specified) -0.05 0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.09, 0.00 
Persecution (base = not specified) -0.08 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.13, -0.04 
      
Independent variables      
Male (base = female) 0.0138 0.02 0.56 0.00 -0.03, 0.06 
Black (base = white) 0.10 0.05 0.05 
0.00 
0.00, 0.20 
Coloured (base = white) 0.09 0.05 0.10 -0.02, 0.19 
18-26 years (base = 27-35 years) 0.01 0.03 0.63 0.00 -0.04, 0.06 
Afrikaans (base = English) 0.08 0.03 0.02 
0.00 
0.01, 0.15 
Xhosa (base = English) 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.02, 0.14 
Primary (base = tertiary) 0.17 0.06 0.00 
0.01 
0.05, 0.29 
Secondary (base = tertiary) 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.01, 0.20 
Unemployed (base = employed) 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.00 -0.02, 0.08 
R101-R175039 (base = R5001+) 0.18 0.43 0.00 
0.01 
0.10, 0.27 
R1751-R5000 (base = R5001+) 0.11 0.41 0.01 0.03, 0.19 
Low-status job (base = decline low-status job)  0.10 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.06, 0.15 
Upper class (base = working class) -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.13, 0.00 
Middle  class (base = working class) -0.04 0.03 0.16 -0.09, 0.02 
Low esteem (base = high esteem) 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.05, 0.16 
Low stigma (base = high stigma) -0.15 0.03 0.00 
0.02 
-0.21, -0.08 
No stigma (base = high stigma) -0.16 0.03 0.00 -0.21, -0.11 
Distrust people (base = trust people) 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.10, 0.19 
Experienced violence (base = no experience of 
violence) 
0.11 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.06, 0.16 
Unsafe neighbourhood (base = safe 
neighbourhood) 
-0.07 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.12, -0.01 
Source: CAPS 2009 
                                                 
36
All variables are dummy variables.  
37
 The pseudo r-squared is based on a probit regression models without the survey (svy) specification.  
38
 Bold face coefficients indicate statistical insignificance. 
39
 The income variable included income earned from the most recent job for respondents who reported that they 
were unemployed at the time of the survey. This was problematic for the researcher, as it does not reflect the 
respondents’ economic position at the time of the survey, and the income variable was left out of the 












Appendix 9: Bivariate Regressions (Immigrant Family) 
Indicator40 dx/dx Std. Err P|z| Psuedo r-
squared41 
95% CI 
Manipulations      
Lesotho (base = Britain) 0.0142 0.03 0. 87 
0.00 
-0.05, 0.06 
Nigeria (base = Britain) 0.01 0.03 0.82 -0.05, 0.06 
Anti-social (base = sociable) 0.45 0.01 0.00 0.25 0.44, 0.47 
      
Independent variables      
Male (base = female) -0.02 0.02 0.53 0.00 -0.06, 0.03 
Coloured (base = Black) 0.10 0.02 0.00 
0.01 
0.05, 0.14 
White (base = Black) 0.05 0.04 0.23 -0.03, 0.14 
18-26 years (base = 27-35 years) -0.01 0.03 0.68 0.00 -0.07, 0.04 
English (base = Xhosa) -0.07 0.03 0.02 
0.01 
-0.13, -0.00 
Xhosa (base = Xhosa) -0.12 0.03 0.00 -0.16, -0.07 
Secondary (base = Primary) -0.06 0.04 0.11 0.00 -0.13, 0.01 
Tertiary (base = Primary) -0.06 0.06 0.28  -0.18, 0.05 
Unemployed (base = employed) 0.02 0.02 0.32 0.00 -0.02, 0.07 
R101-R1750 (base = R5001+) 0.07 0.04 0.10 
0.00 
-0.01, 0.15 
R1751-R5000 (base = R5001+) 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.01, 0.16 
Low-status job (base = decline low-status job) 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.00 -0.01, 0.08 
Upper class (base = working class) 0.07 0.03 0.03 
0.00 
0.01, 0.13 
Middle class (base = working class) 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.01, 0.11 
Low esteem (base = high esteem) -0.06 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.11, -0.01 
High stigma (base = no stigma) 0.12 0.03 0.00 
0.01 
0.07, 0.17 
Low stigma (base = no stigma) 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.02, 0.15 
Distrust (base = trust people) 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02, 0.11 
Experienced violence (base = no experience of 
violence) 
0.04 0.03 0.07 0.00 -0.00, 0.09 
Unsafe neighbourhood (base = safe 
neighbourhood) 
-0.04 0.03 0.15 0.00 -0.10, 0.02 
Source: CAPS 2009 
 
                                                 
40
All variables are dummy variables.  
41
 The pseudo r-squared is based on a probit regression models without the survey (svy) specification.  
42














 Multivariate Regression Models (Undocumented 
Immigrant) 











  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Contextual 
manipulations 
        
Unemployed 0.11 (0.02)***45 0.10 (0.02)*** 0.10 (0.02)*** 0.11 (0.02)*** 
HIV positive 0.07 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)** 
Family starving -0.11 (0.03)*** -0.10 (0.03)*** -0.10 (0.03)*** -0.10 (0.03)*** 
Persecution threat -0.14 (0.03)*** -0.13 (0.03)*** -0.13 (0.03)*** -0.14 (0.03)*** 
Demographic variables         
Male (base = female)   0.0246 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
Black (base = white)   0.44 (0.16)*** 0.38 (0.15)*** 0.24 (0.15)* 
Coloured (base = white)   0.06 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) -0.03 (0.05) 
18-26 years (base = 27 -
35 years) 
  0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 
Afrikaans (base =Xhosa)   0.39 (0.16)*** 0.37 (0.15)*** 0.28 (0.14)** 
English (base = Xhosa)   0.32 (0.15)** 0.33 (0.15)** 0.25 (0.14)* 
Economic variables         
Primary (base = tertiary)     0.08 (0.06) 0.04 (0.07) 
Secondary (base = 
tertiary) 
    0.05 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 
Unemployed (base = 
employed) 
    0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
Low status job (base = 
decline low-status job) 
    0.09 (0.03)*** 0.05 (0.03)* 
Upper class (base = 
working class) 
    0.04 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 
Middle class (base = 
working class) 
    -0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) 
Subjective variables         
Low esteem (base = high 
esteem) 
      0.05 (0.03)* 
Low stigma (base = high 
stigma) 
      -0.12 (0.03)*** 
No stigma (base = high 
stigma) 
      -0.18 (0.02)*** 
Distrust people (base = 
trust people) 
      0.16 (0.02)*** 
Experienced violence 
(base = not experienced 
violence)  
      0.06 (0.03)*** 
Unsafe neighbourhood 
(base = safe 
neighbourhood) 
      -0.10 (0.03)*** 
N  2,799  2,799  2,753  2,509 
Pseudo r-squared47  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.08 
Source: CAPS 2009 
                                                 
43
 These are usually called hierarchical or nested analyses.  
44
 All variables are dummy variables. 
45
 Standard errors reported in brackets. *Significant at the 0.1 level, **significant at the 0.05 level and 
***significant at the 0.01 level. 
46
 Bold face coefficients indicate statistical insignificance.  
47














 Multivariate Regression Models (Immigrant 
Family) 





Labour market position 





  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Contextual 
manipulations 
        
Britain (base = Nigeria) -0.0150 (0.02) 51 -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) 
Lesotho (base = 
Nigeria) 
-0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 
Antisocial (base = 
sociable) 
0.45 (0.01)*** 0.45 (0.01)*** 0.45 (0.01)*** 0.46 (0.01)*** 
Demographic 
variables 
        
Male (base = female)   -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)* 
Coloured (base = 
Black) 
  -0.22 (0.12) -0.20 (0.12)* -0.14 (0.11) 
White (base = Black)   -0.24 (0.13) -0.22 (0.13)* -0.16 (0.12) 
18-26 years (base = 27-
35 years) 
  0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.13) -0.01 (0.02) 
English (base = 
Afrikaans) 
  -0.04 (0.03)* -0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 
Xhosa (base = 
Afrikaans) 
  -0.33 (0.12)*** -0.31 (0.12)*** -0.23 (0.11)** 
Economic variables         
Secondary (base = 
primary) 
    -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) 
Tertiary (base = 
primary) 
    -0.00 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) 
Unemployed (base = 
employed) 
    0.05 (0.02)** 0.03 (0.02)* 
Low-status job (base = 
decline low status job) 
    0.05 (0.02)** 0.04 (0.02)** 
Upper class (base = 
working class) 
    0.05 (0.03)* -0.03 (0.03) 
Middle class (base = 
working class) 
    0.02 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) 
Subjective variables         
Low self-esteem (base 
= high self-esteem) 
      -0.07 (0.02)*** 
Low stigma (base = 
high stigma) 
      -0.06 (0.03)** 
No stigma (base = high 
stigma) 
      -0.13 (0.02)*** 
Distrust people (base = 
trust people) 
      0.09 (0.02)*** 
Witnessed violence 
(base = no experience 
of violence) 
      0.04 (0.02)* 
Unsafe neighbourhood 
(base = safe 
neighbourhood) 
      -0.04 (0.02)* 
N  2,817  2,817  2,770  2,520 
Pseudo r-squared52  0.25  0.26  0.27  0.29 
Source: CAPS 2009 
                                                 
48
 These are usually called hierarchical or nested analyses. 
49
All variables are dummy variables.  
50
 Bold face coefficients indicate statistical insignificance. 
51
 Standard errors reported in brackets. *Significant at the 0.1 level, **significant at the 0.05 level and 
***significant at the 0.01 level. 
52












Appendix 12: Summary statistics (Trader)
53
 
“Is it very bad, bad, neither bad nor good, ok or good” 
   Percent  
Indicator Very bad  Bad  Neither 
bad nor 
good 
Ok Good  Don’t 
know  
Total54 
Gender        
 Female 44 51 3 1 0 0 100 
 Male  44 47 7 1 2 1 100 
Race         
 Black 51 35 9 2 2 1 100 
 Coloured 37 57 3 3 1 1 100 
 White 53 44 2 0 0 0 100 
Language        
 Afrikaans 39 56 3 1 1 1 100 
 English 45 50 4 0 0 0 100 
 Xhosa 51 35 9 2 2 1 100 
Age group        
 18-26 yrs 45 48 4 1 1 1 100 
 27-35 yrs 42 49 6 1 1 0 100 
Education        
 Primary 38 51 5 4 2 2 100 
 Secondary 44 49 5 1 1 1 100 
 Tertiary 50 47 3 0 0 0 100 
Employment        
 Employed  46 48 4 1 1 0 100 
 Unemployed 42 49 6 2 1 1 100 
Income        
 R101-R600 48 46 6 0 0 0 100 
 R601_R1750 49 39 7 3 2 1 100 
 R1751-R5000 38 55 4 1 1 0 100 
 R5001-R14000 44 51 4 0 0 0 100 
 R14000+ 76 24 0 0 0 0 100 
Class        
 Upper class 43 52 3 0 1 0 100 
 Middle class 41 49 6 2 1 1 100 
 Working class 54 38 4 2 2 1 100 
Source: CAPS 2009 
                                                 
53
 “Selected” independent variables are key demographic variables. 
54












Appendix 13: Bivariate Regressions (Trader) 





Contextual factors      
Somali shopkeeper (base = not specified) 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01, 0.06 
Disallow Somali traders (base = getting rich by selling to 
poor people) 
0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01, 0.05 
      
Independent variables      
Female (base = male)  0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03, 0.07 
Black (base = non-black) 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05, 0.09 
Xhosa (base = non-Xhosa) 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05, 0.09 
18-26 years (base 27-35 years) -0.0157 0.01 0.39 0.00 -0.03, 0.01 
Secondary (base = primary) -0.03 0.02 0.05 
0.01 
-0.06, -0.00 
Tertiary (base = primary) -0.08 0.03 0.00 -0.13, -0.03 
Unemployed (base = employed) 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00, 0.05 
R1751-R5000 (base = R101-R1750) -0.06 0.02 0.01 
0.02 
-0.11, -0.01 
R5001+ (base = R101-R1750) -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.07, -0.02 
Low-status job (base = decline low-status job) 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05, 0.94 
Upper class (base = non-upper class) -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.07, -0.03 
Low self-esteem (base = high self-esteem) 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04, 0.09 
No stigma (base = high stigma)  -0.06 0.01 0.00 
0.03 
-0.09, -0.04 
Low stigma (base = high stigma) -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.07, -0.01 
General distrust (base = trust people) -0.01 0.01 0.38 0.00 -0.01, 0.03 
Distrust people in neighbourhood (base = trust people in 
the neighbourhood) 
-0.01 0.01 0.45 0.00 -0.03, 0.01 
Causes of violence:      
Unemployment and poverty (base = disagree) 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.00 -0.01, 0.06 
Young people do not learn about respect and discipline 
in the home or at school (base = disagree) 
0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00, 0.06 
Men drink too much (base = disagree) 0.02 0.01 0.20 0.00 -0.01, 0.04 
Police and courts are ineffective (base = disagree) 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04, 0.08 
People in the family often lose their temper (base = 
family do not lose their temper) 
0.01 0.01 0.23 0.00 -0.01, 0.03 
People in the family sometimes hit each other (base = 
family do not hit each other) 
0.11 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.08, 0.13 
Witnessed violence outside of the home (base = no 
experience of violence) 
0.07 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05, 0.10 
Feel unsafe during the day (base = safe during the day) -0.02 0.02 0.23 0.00 -0.05, 0.01 
Feel unsafe during after dark (base = safe after dark) 0.01 0.01 0.54 0.00 -0.02, -0.03 
Source: CAPS 2009 
                                                 
55
All variables are dummy variables.  
56
 The pseudo r-squared is based on a probit regression models without the survey (svy) specification.  
57












Appendix 14: Sequential Multivariate Regression Models (Trader) 











  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Contextual manipulation         
Somali shopkeeper (base = not 
specified) 
0.03 (0.02)**59 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)*** 
Disallow Somali trader (base = 
getting rich by selling to poor 
people) 
0.0260 (0.18) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Demographic variables         
Female  (base = male)   0.04 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 
Black (base = non-black)   0.07 (0.00)*** 0.05 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)*** 
18-27 years (base = 27-35 
years) 
  -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Economic variables         
Secondary (base = primary)     -0.03 (0.02)* -0.02 (0.02) 
Tertiary (base = primary)     -0.04 (0.03)* -0.02 (0.03) 
Unemployed  (base = 
employed) 
    0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Low-status job (base = decline 
low-status job) 
    0.00 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)* 
Upper class (base = non-upper 
class) 
    -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Subjective variables         
Low esteem (base = high-
esteem) 
      0.01 (0.01) 
No stigma (base = high stigma)       0.05 (0.01)*** 
Low stigma (base = high 
stigma) 
      0.03 (0.02)** 
Distrusts people (base = trust 
people) 
      0.04 (0.02)** 
Distrusts people in the 
neighbourhood (base = trust 
people in the neighbourhood) 
      -0.02 (0.02) 
Causes of violence:         
Poverty (base = disagree)       0.00 (0.02) 
Lack of respect (base = 
disagree) 
      0.02 (0.01) 
Men drink much (base = 
disagree) 
      0.00 (0.01) 
Ineffective police (base = 
disagree) 
      0.05 (0.01)*** 
Family lose temper (base = 
family do not lose temper) 
      -0.03 (0.01)*** 
Family hit each other (base = 
family do not hit each other) 
      0.09 (0.01)*** 
Witnessed violence outside the 
home (base = no experience of 
violence) 
      0.04 (0.01)*** 
Neighbourhood unsafe during 
the day (base = neighbourhood  
safe during the day) 
      -0.04 (0.02)*** 
Neighbourhood unsafe after 
dark (base = neighbourhood  
safe after dark) 
      -0.02 (0.01) 
N  2,894  2,894  2,846  2,404 
Pseudo r-squared61  0.01  0.07  0.09  0.21 
Source: CAPS 2009 
                                                 
58
All variables are dummy variables.  
59
 Standard errors reported in brackets. *Significant at the 0.1 level, **significant at the 0.05 level and 
***significant at the 0.01 level. 
60
 Bold face coefficients indicate statistical insignificance.  
61
 The pseudo r-squared is based on a probit regression models without the survey (svy) specification.  
